Doping in Sports and the Use of State Power by Mehlman, Maxwell J. et al.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 50 
Number 1 (Fall 2005) Article 5 
2005 
Doping in Sports and the Use of State Power 
Maxwell J. Mehlman 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law 
Elizabeth Banger 
Matthew M. Wright 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Elizabeth Banger & Matthew M. Wright, Doping in Sports and the Use of State 
Power, 50 St. Louis U. L.J. (2005). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol50/iss1/5 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
15 
DOPING IN SPORTS AND THE USE OF STATE POWER 
MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN,* ELIZABETH BANGER** 
& MATTHEW M. WRIGHT*** 
Within the world of sports, a war against the use of performance-
enhancing drugs has been waged since the late 1960s.  Beginning in the late 
1980s, however, the use of drugs in sports, generally referred to as “doping,”1 
began to attract the attention of the government.  After a series of hearings in 
1988, 1989, and 1990, Congress placed anabolic steroids on the list of 
controlled substances, making it a felony to distribute them for non-medical 
purposes,2 and amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to make it 
a felony to distribute, or possess with the intent to distribute, human growth 
hormone (HGH) other than to treat disease.3  When the dietary supplement 
 
* Arthur E. Petersilge Professor of Law, Director, The Law-Medicine Center, Case School of 
Law, and Professor of Bioethics, Case School of Medicine. The author wishes to thank Dawn 
Richards for her help with the manuscript. 
** J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2007. 
*** J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2006. 
 1. The term “doping” is used to refer to the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sports 
in general.  See STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 517 (26th ed. 1995).  The term “blood 
doping” technically refers to the practice of infusing blood, either the athlete’s own (autologous) 
or someone else’s (homologous) in order to increase the number of red blood cells, which carry 
oxygen.  See American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Blood 
Doping, Report B-I-85 (1985), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ 
ceja_bi85.pdf. 
 2. See Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball’s Efforts 
to Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 5 (2005) 
[hereinafter Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime] (opening statement of Chairman Tom Davis).  
Congress placed steroids in Schedule III of the list of controlled substances.  Id.  Substances on 
Schedule III have a lesser potential for abuse than the drugs or other substances in Schedules I 
and II, have a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, and abuse of these 
substances may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence.  
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act § 202, 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(3) (2000). 
 3. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, §1904, 104 Stat. 4789, 4853 (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 333(e) (2000)).  As originally proposed, section 333(e) was to read: 
[W]hoever knowingly distributes, or possesses with intent to distribute, human growth 
hormone for any use in humans other than the treatment of a disease or other recognized 
medical condition pursuant to the order of a physician is guilty of an offense punishable 
by not more than 5 years in prison, such fines as are authorized by title 18, United States 
code, or both. 
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manufacturer BALCO was accused of concocting and distributing steroid 
analogues, known as designer steroids,4 that could not be detected by existing 
tests and that technically were not covered by the Controlled Substances Act, 
Congress amended the Act in 2004 to close this loophole.5  In the winter of 
2005, the U.S. Senate launched an investigation into the allegations of steroid 
use amongst baseball players.6  Senator John McCain threatened to revoke 
baseball’s exemption from federal antitrust laws if it did not clean up its 
players.7  Later hearings targeted professional basketball and football.8  And in 
his first State of the Union message since the invasion of Iraq, President Bush 
declared: 
 
Steroid Trafficking Act of 1989, S. 1829, 101st Cong. § 201 (1989).  This would have allowed 
physicians to prescribe the drug for any purpose, in keeping with their traditional power to 
prescribe drugs for “off-label” uses—that is, for purposes for which they have not been reviewed 
and approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.  The final language of the amendment, 
however, reads: 
[W]hoever knowingly distributes, or possesses with intent to distribute, human growth 
hormone for any use in humans other than the treatment of a disease or other recognized 
medical condition, where such use has been authorized by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services under section 355 of this title and pursuant to the order of a physician, is 
guilty of an offense punishable by not more than 5 years in prison, such fines as are 
authorized by Title 18, or both. 
21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (emphasis added).  This suggests that physicians may only prescribe HGH 
for purposes for which the FDA has approved.  The meaning of the phrase “where such use has 
been authorized by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 355” is difficult to 
ascertain, since it is so poorly drafted and there is no clarifying legislative history.  If it truly 
means that HGH cannot lawfully be prescribed for off-label uses, then it represents an 
unprecedented government invasion of physician decision-making autonomy. 
 4. See Jack Curry, 4 Indicted in a Steroid Scheme That Involved Top Pro Athletes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A1.  In February 2004, four men associated with BALCO were indicted 
on charges of illegally distributing steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs to athletes 
and making a concerted effort to conceal the distribution by using code words to refer to the drugs 
in communications with athletes.  Id.  The indictments were issued against Barry Bonds’ personal 
trainer, a prominent coach of several Olympic track and field athletes, and two executives of 
BALCO following a two-year investigation of the company, during which an empty box of vials 
of serostin (a human growth hormone), empty containers of testosterone and Oxandrin (anabolic 
steroids), an empty box of Epogen (a prescription version of erythropoietin) and dozens of 
syringe wrappers were found in the trash outside the company’s offices.  Id. 
 5. Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-358, § 2195, 118 Stat. 1661 
(2004). 
 6. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 2. 
 7. See 150 CONG. REC. S3997–3998 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain). 
 8. Steroid Use in Sports Part II: Examining the National Football League’s Policy on 
Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th 
Cong. (2005) [hereinafter NFL Hearing]; Steroid Use in Sports Part III: Examining the National 
Basketball Association’s Steroid Testing Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t 
Reform, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter NBA Hearing]. 
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To help children make right choices, they need good examples.  Athletics play 
such an important role in our society, but, unfortunately, some in professional 
sports are not setting much of an example.  The use of performance-enhancing 
drugs like steroids in baseball, football, and other sports is dangerous, and it 
sends the wrong message—that there are shortcuts to accomplishment, and that 
performance is more important than character.  So tonight I call on team 
owners, union representatives, coaches, and players to take the lead, to send 
the right signal, to get tough, and to get rid of steroids now.9 
States have not directly addressed doping in competitive athletics.  
However, most states have updated their controlled substance acts to reflect the 
federal stance against anabolic steroids.10  They have also made additional 
efforts to regulate steroids in schools and to disseminate information about the 
dangers of anabolic steroids.11 
What accounts for this intrusion of government into the private world of 
sports?  By what authority does government act?  And most importantly, how 
does this bode for the legal status of use of biomedical enhancement outside of 
sports? 
I.  THE HISTORY OF DOPING IN SPORTS 
The use of performance-enhancing substances is probably as old as 
competitive sport itself.12  Records from the earliest Olympics reveal that 
athletes drank herbal beverages to give them energy.13  During the late 19th 
century, competitors ingested a variety of substances, including caffeine, 
cocaine, strychnine, and alcohol.14  The term “doping” comes from the 19th 
century Dutch word “dop,” the name for a potion that Zulu warriors consumed 
to help them vanquish their foes.15  In 1904, Thomas Hicks won the Olympic 
marathon after drinking French brandy, strychnine, egg whites, and sponges of 
warm water served to him from assistants in an automobile.16  In 1924, former 
 
 9. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html. 
 10. See Appendix A for a table detailing how states have chosen to schedule drugs. 
 11. See Appendix B for a complete list of state laws relating to steroids. 
 12. World Anti-Doping Agency, History of Anti-Doping, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/ 
dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=312 [hereinafter WADA Anti-Doping History] (last visited Jan. 4, 
2006). 
 13. See id. 
 14. Michele Verroken, Drug Use and Abuse in Sport, in DRUGS IN SPORT 18, 18 (David R. 
Mottram ed., 2d ed. 1996). 
 15. WADA Anti-Doping History, supra note 12. 
 16. Id.; Mary Delach Leonard, St. Louis Hosts Olympics, STLTODAY.COM, Jan. 13, 2004, 
http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/special/pd125.nsf/0/A67FC7DF8E1F5EF686256E12004
D3ADD?OpenDocument. 
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Tour de France winner Henri Pelissier showed the contents of his medicine bag 
to journalists: cocaine, chloroform, and various pills.17 
During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the performance-enhancing drugs 
of choice primarily were stimulants and calmatives.  Athletes continue to 
employ these types of substances, including amphetamines and beta-blockers 
(used in shooting competitions to improve accuracy by slowing the heart 
rate).18  In the mid-20th century, attention shifted to two primary objectives.  
The first was to increase the number of red blood cells in the circulatory 
system.  Researchers discovered that with higher levels of red blood cells, 
more oxygen gets to the tissues, improving the athlete’s energy and 
endurance.19  In the 1970s, a Swedish sports physician developed what became 
known as “blood doping”—the use of blood transfusions to increase the 
number of circulating red blood cells.20  The next breakthrough came with the 
development of recombinant DNA manufacturing technology.  This enabled 
drug companies in 1985 to synthesize erythropoietin (EPO),21 a naturally 
occurring substance that stimulates the manufacture of red blood cells.22  
Lately, athletes have taken to sleeping in artificial atmospheres, so-called 
nitrogen tents and “houses.”  These mimic the effects of sleeping at high 
altitudes, which increases the blood’s capacity to carry oxygen.23 
The second major goal of modern performance enhancement in sports has 
been to grow more muscle tissue.  The chief substances of interest have been 
hormones known as anabolic steroids.24  These have been commercially 
available in the United States since 1958, although their development was a 
long process.25  The process began in the 1920s when researchers first 
 
 17. Tim Moore, History, Drugs and the Tour de France, AMAZON.COM, 
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/tg/feature/-/187085/202-3712162-0701452. 
 18. See Ron Kroichick, Lab Scandal Brings Issue of Steroids in Sports to the Forefront, S.F. 
CHRON., Oct. 26, 2003, at B1. 
 19. IVAN WADDINGTON, SPORT, HEALTH, AND DRUGS: A CRITICAL SOCIOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE, 146 (2000). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Fu-Kuen Lin et al., Cloning and Expression of the Human Erythropoietin Gene, 82 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7580, 7580–82 (1985). 
 22. John M. Tokish et al., Ergogenic Aids: A Review of Basic Science, Performance, Side 
Effects, and Status in Sports, 32 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 1543, 1547 (2004). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Anabolic steroids are distinguished from estrogenic steroids, progesterogenic steroids, 
and corticogenic steroids.  Estrogenic and progesterogenic steroids are derived from estrogen and 
progesterone, respectively, and are widely used for hormone replacement therapy in women and 
as hormonal contraceptives.  WILLIAM N. TAYLOR, ANABOLIC STEROIDS AND THE ATHLETE, 168 
(2d ed. 2002).  Corticogenic steroids are anti-inflammatory agents and are often used in 
conjunction with analgesics.  See Karl Heusler & Jaroslav Kalvoda, Between Basic and Applied 
Research: Ciba’s Involvement in Steroids in the 1950s and 1960s, 61 STEROIDS 492, 499 (1996). 
 25. See JOHN M. HOBERMAN, MORTAL ENGINES: THE SCIENCE OF PERFORMANCE AND THE 
DEHUMANIZATION OF SPORT 266 (1992). 
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attempted to isolate testosterone, which was not accomplished until 1935.26  In 
subsequent years, research on testosterone focused on clinical applications, and 
when the anabolic-androgenic steroids were first marketed, they were used to 
treat burn victims.27  However, testosterone’s muscle-building properties were 
already well known, and it was rumored that Soviet athletes had been using 
testosterone to great effect starting in the 1950s.28  With high demand for 
steroids, pharmaceutical companies began to synthesize them in earnest and by 
the mid-1960s, more than a dozen anabolic steroids were on the market for 
medicinal purposes.29 
Studies examining the effects of anabolic steroids followed.  From the 
mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, approximately twenty scientific studies were 
published on the potential ability of anabolic steroids to increase strength and 
muscle mass.30  Opinion was divided.  Half the studies claimed that anabolic 
steroids did have such properties, but the other half disagreed.31  While the 
scientific community remained split, anecdotal evidence was mounting that 
steroids were, in fact, extremely effective in their ability to improve muscle 
strength and mass.  Anabolic steroids were also increasingly popular among 
athletes, particularly weightlifters and track-and-field competitors.32 
Breakthroughs in performance enhancement in sports are now beginning to 
flow from the revolution in human genetics.  Recombinant DNA 
manufacturing has allowed unlimited quantities of HGH to be produced.33  
Many athletes believe that HGH, previously available only from the pituitary 
glands of cadavers, can increase the size and strength of muscle tissue and 
decrease body fat via enhanced protein synthesis and a mobilization of fat 
tissue.34  In addition to its perceived anabolic benefits, some athletes also 
believe that HGH can strengthen and prevent damage to tendons, prevent stress 
fractures, and speed the healing process after injuries.35  Another genetic 
intervention that is beginning to impact athletics is genetic testing.  
Researchers have discovered genetic variations associated with the ability to 
run short and long distances respectively.36  In Australia, a genetic test for this 
 
 26. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 178. 
 27. WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 144. 
 28. Id. 
 29. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 17. 
 30. Id. at 111. 
 31. Id. 
 32. WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 144–45. 
 33. See Verroken, supra note 14, at 23; P.H. Sonksen, Hormones and Sport: Insulin, Growth 
Hormone and Sport, 170 J. ENDOCRINOLOGY 13, 18 (2001). 
 34. Sonksen, supra note 33, at 18–19. 
 35. Id. at 21. 
 36. E.g., Nan Yang et al., ACTN3 Genotype Is Associated with Human Elite Athletic 
Performance, 73 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 627, 627 (2003). 
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variation can now be purchased for approximately $100.37  It is conceivable 
that athletes, teams, schools, coaches, and parents will employ the test to 
identify the running sport best suited to individual genetic profiles. 
In the future, gene transfer technology may allow more exotic 
interventions.  Gene therapy can be used to manipulate the chemical signals 
involved in normal muscle repair to stimulate and augment the process.38  The 
sports community is closely watching research on the use of gene therapy to 
treat muscle-wasting diseases, because the same techniques could be used to 
grow and nourish muscle in healthy persons.  The emerging field of 
pharmacogenetics, which uses genetic testing to individualize drug treatment, 
also could dramatically increase the safety and effectiveness of performance-
enhancing drugs in sports.39 
 
 37. Chip Le Grand, Gene Test Identifies Sporting Chance, THE AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 22, 
2004, at 3.  The test is marketed by Genetic Technologies of Melbourne.  Id. 
 38. In normal muscle repair, the microscopic tears in the muscle fiber produced by physical 
exertion set off a chemical signal that triggers regeneration of the tissue by repairing the outer 
membrane of the muscle fibers and adding new myofibrils to the interior.  H. Lee Sweeney, Gene 
Doping, SCI. AM., July 2004, 63, 64.  This process is mediated by insulin-like growth factor-1 
(IGF-1), which signals muscle-specific stem cells called satellite cells to proliferate via normal 
cell division and fuse with the muscle fiber to add new nuclei to the cell, while another growth-
regulating factor, myostatin, signals them to stop.  Id. at 64–66.  Research has been conducted in 
which a synthetic gene that produces IGF-1 in skeletal muscle has been introduced into the 
skeletal muscle cells of mice using a virus as the vector and creating mice genetically engineered 
to overproduce IGF-1 in skeletal muscle tissue.  Id. at 66–67.  The research has demonstrated that 
such techniques result in muscles that grow larger and retain more regenerative capacity even as 
the animal ages.  Id.  This enhanced muscle repair and growth ability was demonstrated even in 
sedentary animals, indicating that gene therapy using IGF-1 can mimic the normal, exercise-
induced regenerative process.  Id.  It is also possible that gene therapy could be used to block 
myostatin production, another mechanism by which muscle growth could be enhanced.  Id. at 69. 
 39. The rationale for pharmacogenetics is that a significant amount of the variation in 
individuals’ reactions to different drugs—why only some people suffer adverse reactions from 
certain substances, for example, or why some therapeutic entities are effective only in some 
people—is believed to be due to genetic differences.  See Lars Noah, The Coming 
Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients’ Genetic Profiles, 43 
JURIMETRICS J. 1, 7 (2002). The idea is to conduct genetic testing on patients to discern these 
differences and then tailor drug therapy based on the results.  See id.  On June 23, 2005, the FDA 
approved the first drug to treat heart failure in a self-defined African-American population.  Press 
Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Approves BiDil Heart Failure Drug for Black 
Patients (June 23, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2005/NEW01190.html.  Yet 
there is substantial controversy over whether African-Americans are genetically identifiable.  See 
Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for “Race” as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1093, 
1116–17 (2004).  For further insights into the ethical and legal issues raised by pharmacogenetics, 
see Allen Buchanan et al., Pharmacogenetics: Ethical Issues and Policy Options, 12 KENNEDY 
INST. ETHICS J. 1 (2002) and Noah, supra. 
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II.  ANTI-DOPING EFFORTS WITHIN SPORT 
A. History 
Athletes have long sought competitive advantage by introducing 
substances into their bodies.  But it was not until the 1930s that the first signs 
of a change in attitude towards doping in sport became apparent.  At the time, 
amphetamines were becoming increasingly popular among athletes and had 
replaced strychnine as the performance enhancement of choice.40  In 1933, the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) first turned its attention to doping.  
During a meeting of the Olympic Committee, Paul Rousseau, a member of the 
French National Olympic Committee, delivered a statement to the IOC 
claiming that doping was a violation of the spirit of the Olympics.41  
Rousseau’s report was followed by an inquiry into doping, and in 1937, Lord 
Burghley addressed the practices, methods, and effects of doping in the thirty-
seventh session of the IOC in Moscow.42  The following year, the IOC 
condemned doping.43 
Concerns about doping were suspended during World War II, during 
which new amphetamines were developed for and used by the military.44  
Pioneering research also was conducted into the effects and chemical 
structures of testosterone and other steroids.45  In 1948, the therapeutic effects 
of cortisone were identified and there was a push for mass production.46  The 
next decade was a highly productive one in steroid research, with the 
development of prednisone and perdnisolone (both powerful anti-
inflammatories)47 and the commericial introduction of the first anabolic-
androgenic steroid, Dianabol.48 
Simultaneously, the medical establishment began to investigate the use of 
amphetamines by competitive athletes.  In 1957, The New York Times reported 
that Olympic swimmers freely admitted to using “pep pills.”49  Following the 
 
 40. WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 114. 
 41. Ruud Stokvis, Moral Entrepreneurship and Doping Cultures in Sport 6 (Amsterdam 
School for Social Science Research, Working Paper No. 03/04, 2003), available at 
http://www2.fmg.uva.nl/assr/frdocs/wp/downloads/ASSR-WP0304.pdf.  The International 
Amateur Athletic Federation first banned doping in 1928.  WADA Anti-Doping History, supra 
note 12. 
 42. ALBERT DIRIX & XAVIER STURBOIS, THE FIRST THIRTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
OLYMPIC COMMITTEE MEDICAL COMMISSION 1967–1997, at 14 (1998). 
 43. Id. 
 44. WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 115. 
 45. Heusler & Kalvoda, supra note 24, at 492. 
 46. Id. at 493. 
 47. Id. 
 48. HOBERMAN, supra note 25, at 266. 
 49. Athletes Report Use of ‘Pep Pills,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1957, at 20. 
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Times report, the American College of Sports Medicine authorized its president 
to appoint a committee to study amphetamine use among American athletes.50  
Two years later, Henry Beecher (famous for his uncovering of ethical abuses in 
human subjects research)51 published a study in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association confirming that amphetamines did affect swimmers.52  
Beecher found that athletes who were given doses of amphetamines before 
attempting to beat their previous best performances were more successful that 
those who did not take the pills.53 
While amphetamines were becoming increasingly popular, there were also 
indications that they were harmful.  In 1960, the IOC focused its attention on 
the use of amphetamine sulfates in pill form.54  During the Rome Olympics, 
twenty-two-year-old Danish cyclist Knud Enemark Jensen died of 
amphetamine use.55  According to contemporary news reports, Jensen 
collapsed from heatstroke approximately thirteen miles from the finish line of 
the 100-kilometer (62.5-mile) team road race and died later at the hospital.56  
Later it was revealed that Jensen and two teammates had taken large doses of 
amphetamines to boost their performance.57  Subsequently, in 1962, the IOC 
began discussions in earnest with the Federation Internationale Medicine-
Sportive (FIMS), an organization of sports physicians, expressing concern that 
the problem of doping was growing.58 
Although attention was being drawn to amphetamine abuse by the early 
1960s, anabolic steroids were not subject to similar scrutiny until much later.  
Throughout the 1950s, there were rumors that the Soviets were experimenting 
with testosterone as a way to improve athletic performance; these rumors were 
not confirmed until the mid-1950s, at which point American team physician 
Dr. John Ziegler obtained testosterone and began experimenting with it.59  
Ziegler’s work and collaboration with the pharmaceutical company Ciba 
resulted in the commercial introduction of Dianabol, the first steroid marketed 
in the United States.60 
 
 50. Sport Physicians to Check on Pills, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1957, at 52. 
 51. See Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354 
(1966). 
 52. Gene M. Smith & Henry K. Beecher, Amphetamine Sulfate and Athletic Performance, 
170 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 542 (1959). 
 53. Id. at 557. 
 54. DIRIX & STURBOIS, supra note 42, at 14. 
 55. WADA Anti-Doping History, supra note 12. 
 56. Dane in Rome Bike Race Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1960, at 13. 
 57. James C. Puffer, Drugs in Colleges: To Test or Not To Test, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1988, 
§ 8 (Sports), at 7. 
 58. Stokvis, supra note 41, at 7. 
 59. WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 144. 
 60. HOBERMAN supra note 25, at 266. 
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In the following years, doping generated considerable attention and 
discussion, but relatively little action.  In 1963, the Council of Europe set up a 
commission on drugs and doping, but the committee was unable to agree on a 
definition of doping.61  In 1965, another report on doping was delivered to the 
IOC, but did not result in any definitive policy change.62  At the highest levels, 
doping was condemned, but it was neither banned outright, nor were athletes 
subjected to testing.63  However, France and Belgium introduced anti-doping 
laws in the 1960s,64 and the international governing bodies of cycling (the 
UCI) and soccer (FIFA) introduced testing for athletes in championship 
competitions in 1966.65 
The problem of doping, however, continued.  In 1967, British cyclist Tom 
Simpson died during the Tour de France,66 and his autopsy report included 
positive tests for both amphetamine and methyl-amphetamine.67  Like Jenson, 
Simpson collapsed on an incredibly hot day after hours of physical exertion, 
and his official cause of death was listed as “heart failure caused by 
exhaustion.”68  Simpson’s death was also notable because he had previously 
acknowledged his drug use to the press, likening amphetamine use to a couple 
of extra cups of coffee.69  Simpson and others also implied that stimulant use 
was rampant among cyclists.70  French cyclist Jacques Anquetil claimed that 
no one “used dope . . . but stimulants were another thing.  Everybody had to be 
hyped up to maintain the speeds demanded by the public.”71  In addition, 
anabolic steroids were increasingly popular among athletes.  By 1968, a third 
of the American track and field team was reported to be using them.72 
The IOC responded to Simpson’s death and public discussions of doping 
by forming the Olympic Medical Commission in 1967.73  In 1968, it began 
testing athletes for the first time, although it was not until 1976 that the first 
 
 61. Council of Europe, Europack: An Education and Information Guide on Sport Without 
Doping, http://www.coe.int/T/E/cultural_co-operation/Sport/Doping/eEuropack.asp [hereinafter 
Council of Europe] (last visited Jan. 4, 2006). 
 62. Stokvis, supra note 41, at 8. 
 63. Council of Europe, supra note 61. 
 64. Id. 
 65. WADA Anti-Doping History, supra note 12. 
 66. John Hess, Simpson Dies in Tour de France, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1967, at 24 
[hereinafter Hess, Simpson]. 
 67. Drugs Discovered in Cyclist’s Autopsy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1967, at 26. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Hess, Simpson, supra note 66, at 24. 
 70. Id.; John L. Hess, Anti-Doping Rules Threatening Anquetil’s Bicycle Speed Mark, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1967, at 62 [hereinafter Hess, Anti-Doping]. 
 71. Hess, Anti-Doping, supra note 70, at 62. 
 72. WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 145. 
 73. WADA Anti-Doping History, supra note 12. 
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tests for anabolic steroids were conducted,74 almost twenty years after they 
first became commercially available in the United States.75  Though the IOC 
publicly condemned doping, it was largely powerless to stop the use of 
performance enhancing drugs.  The IOC’s first banned drugs list contained 
only two categories, stimulants and narcotic analgesics, because these were the 
only questionable substances that could be detected by existing testing.76  In 
1983, testosterone was added, followed by diuretics, beta-blockers, and blood 
doping in 1985.77  As the IOC struggled to keep up with doping methods, it 
also had to keep track of masking methods.  In 1985, the IOC banned the 
manipulation of urine samples and added Probencid and other masking agents 
to the prohibited list two years later.78  It also started blood tests in 1988 for 
some athletes and continued adding substances to the list, including human 
chorionic gonadotropin (used to reverse the testicular shrinking that sometimes 
accompanies anabolic steroid use) in 1987, and HGH and peptide hormones in 
1989.79 
While the IOC’s list of banned substances and methods continued to grow 
throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, it was still unsuccessful at catching 
dopers.  At the Moscow Games in 1980, no Olympic athlete tested positive,80 
even though the East Germans were systematically doping their athletes.81  
Between 1976 and 1994, no more than a dozen athletes tested positive for 
performance enhancers in any given Olympics, and in several Olympics there 
were no positive tests at all.82  Despite the high-profile disqualification of gold 
medalist Ben Johnson at the Seoul Olympics in 1988,83 doping control made 
very little headway in effectively banning performance enhancing drugs, and 
the perception remained that the IOC was neither catching dopers nor 
punishing those who were implicated.84 
The IOC was vocal about its anti-doping efforts, but it often seemed that 
its rhetoric was just talk.  This was particularly apparent when Chinese 
 
 74. JOHN HOBERMAN, TESTOSTERONE DREAMS: REJUVENATION, APHRODISIA, DOPING 243 
(2005). 
 75. See HOBERMAN supra note 25, at 266. 
 76. Verroken, supra note 14, at 23. 
 77. Id. at 23–24. 
 78. Id. at 24–25. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Michele Verroken & David R. Mottram, Doping Control in Sport, in DRUGS IN SPORT 
235, 237 (David R. Mottram ed., 2d ed. 1996). 
 81. Associated Press, Swimming: Olympian Tells of Steroid Use, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1998, 
at C5. 
 82. Verroken & Mottram, supra note 80, at 237. 
 83. Edward H. Jurith & Mark W. Beddoes, The United States’ and International Response to 
the Problem of Doping in Sports, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 461, 467 
(2002). 
 84. See id. at 481. 
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swimmers were accused of doping in the early 1990s.85  Despite repeated calls 
for investigations, the IOC and FINA (the international governing body of 
swimming) refused to admit a problem existed.86  FINA also declined to 
enforce its own anti-doping rules against the Chinese.87  When swimmer Yuan 
Yuan was found with thirteen vials of HGH at the World Championships in 
Perth, Australia, she was the only athlete disciplined, despite the fact that she 
was carrying enough HGH for the entire team.88  The scandal was further 
exacerbated when China nominated Juan Samaranch, president of the IOC, for 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993, which some alleged was meant to curry favor to 
avoid sanctions.89  In 1998, a doping scandal rocked the Tour de France, when 
the entire Festina team was disqualified,90 seven teams were implicated in 
doping, and dozens of athletes tested positive for EPO.91  In 2000, Andreea 
Raducan, a Romanian gymnast, was stripped of her gold medal at the Sydney 
Olympics following a positive drug test for pseudoephedrine (a stimulant 
commonly found in cold medicine).92  Rumors also abounded that American 
track and field athletes were actively involved in doping and the BALCO 
scandal.93  Shot-putter C.J. Hunter resigned from the sport following four 
positive drug tests in 2000.94  With mounting political pressure to confront the 
problem of doping, the IOC made the decision to remove itself from drug 
testing, and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was formed on 
November 10, 1999.95  WADA was created to be an independent oversight 
agency, but the IOC still exercises considerable control over it and holds 
sixteen spots on the thirty-five-person board.96  The agency was created with a 
list of express objectives: “Promote and coordinate the fight against doping[;] 
[r]einforce the ethical basis for anti-doping and protect the health of athletes[;] 
[e]stablish and maintain a list of prohibited substances[;] [c]oordinate no 
notice, out-of-competition testing[;] [d]evelop analytical standards[;] [p]romote 
 
 85. See David Galluzzi, The Doping Crisis in International Athletic Competition: Lessons 
from the Chinese Doping Scandal in Women’s Swimming, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 65, 77–90 
(2000), for a full explanation of the Chinese doping scandal in women’s swimming. 
 86. Id. at 78–90. 
 87. Id. at 80–81. 
 88. Id. at 84. 
 89. Id. at 97–98. 
 90. John T. Wendt, WADA, Doping and THG, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Winter 2004, at 1, 28. 
 91. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 83, at 467. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Jere Longman, Anti-Doping Agency Enters a Gray Area, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004, 
at D1. 
 94. Associated Press, Track and Field: C.J. Hunter Reassigned at North Carolina State, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2004, at D5. 
 95. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 83, at 480–81. 
 96. Steve Keating, IOC Unveils Clean-up Campaign, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 11, 
1999, at 27. 
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harmonized sanctions[;] [d]evelop education programs[;] [p]romote and 
coordinate peer-reviewed research.”97  Since its inception, WADA has 
developed a variety of long-term planning initiatives, including its Strategic 
Plan for 2004–2009, addressing a World Doping Code, education, research, 
and improving WADA’s testing and enforcement capacity.98  With funding 
from the IOC and national anti-doping agencies, WADA certifies laboratories, 
oversees and conducts drug testing, funds doping research, and undertakes 
significant outreach and education projects.99 
B. Rationales for Banning Doping 
Success in sports is the product of many ingredients.  Among them are 
good equipment; proper coaching; hard work; a financially and emotionally 
supportive environment, including one’s family; psychological traits, such as 
mental focus and a drive to win; the right physical constitution, including the 
ability to absorb punishment; and good medical care for illness and injury.  Yet 
organized sports deem one potential ingredient—doping—to lie beyond the 
pale of acceptability.  The question is why. 
At the outset, it is important to note that this is not the same question as 
asking whether athletes who are caught using banned substances deserve to be 
punished.  Morally, these athletes are no different from baseball players who 
“cork” their bats100 or marathon runners who begin their races by slipping onto 
the course near the finish line.101  Disagreements may arise concerning which 
substances should be banned,102 how infractions should be detected (for 
example, whether to conduct drug testing only during competition),103 and 
 
 97. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 83, at 482 (citations omitted). 
 98. World Anti-Doping Agency, Strategic Plan, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2? 
pageCategory.id=257 (last visited Jan. 4, 2006). 
 99. World Anti-Doping Agency, Science and Research, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/ 
dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=249 (last visited Jan. 4, 2006). 
 100. In June 2003, Chicago Cubs slugger Sammy Sosa was ejected from the game when a 50-
cent-piece-sized chunk of cork was discovered in his bat after it split.  Unsplendid Splinter: Cubs 
Rally Past Rays After Sosa’s Ignominious Ejection, SI.COM, June 3, 2003, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/news/2003/06/03/sosa_ejected_ap/.  The object of 
corking is to lighten the bat, making it easier to swing.  See Peter Gammons, Criticism of Sosa 
Way Off Base, ESPN.COM, June 6, 2003, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/gammons/ 
story?id=1564438. 
 101. On April 21, 1980, a woman named Rosie Ruiz was the first woman to finish the Boston 
Marathon.  Kevin Paul Dupont, Rosie Ruiz: From Kenmore Square to West Palm Beach, Fla., It’s 
Been Mystery, BOSTON GLOBE, April 14, 1996, at 69.  Later it was determined that she had 
started the race about a mile from the finish line.  Id. 
 102. See discussion infra accompanying notes 144–153 concerning appropriateness of 
banning relatively harmless substances. 
 103. See Jere Longman, U.S. Swim Coach Calls for Increase of Random Testing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 19, 2000, at D6 (discussing call by U.S. women’s Olympic swim coach for more frequent 
out-of-competition drug testing of his athletes and allegations that the world swimming governing 
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whether alleged wrongdoers are afforded proper procedural protections.104  
Once the rules are adopted, however, competitors have no morally defensible 
option except to abide by them or refrain from engaging in the sport.  The 
question here is different.  Assuming that drugs are against the rules, what we 
are trying to find out is why. 
1. Safety 
One of the reasons originally set forth by the Olympic Medical 
Commission for banning doping was “[p]rotecting the athletes’ health.”105  
Listening to opponents of doping, one would think that the substances used by 
athletes to improve performance were extremely dangerous, if not lethal.  In 
regard to steroids, for example, the National Institute on Drug Abuse states: 
The major side effects from abusing anabolic steroids can include liver tumors 
and cancer, jaundice (yellowish pigmentation of skin, tissues, and body fluids), 
fluid retention, high blood pressure, increases in LDL (bad cholesterol), and 
decreases in HDL (good cholesterol). Other side effects include kidney tumors, 
severe acne, and trembling.106 
NIDA describes a number of additional gender-specific side effects: 
For men—shrinking of the testicles, reduced sperm count, infertility, baldness, 
development of breasts, increased risk for prostate cancer. 
 
body fails to devote enough resources to random testing); Dick Patrick, Olympic-Style Drug 
Testing is Rigid, USA TODAY, July 8, 2002, at 8C (contrasting Major  League Baseball’s lack of 
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 104. See Jere Longman, Jones’s Lawyers Challenge Evidence Against Her, N.Y. TIMES, May 
26, 2004, at D1 (discussing the attempts by Marion Jones’ lawyers to discount documentary 
evidence of her steroid use on the grounds that it did not prove her guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt); Jere Longman & Liz Robbins, Sprinter Barred from Olympics As U.S. Doping Scandal 
Grows, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at A1 (discussing the suspension of U.S. sprinter Kelli White 
from Olympic competition based on documents obtained in the BALCO lab investigation rather 
than a positive drug test, and discussing athletes’ legal challenges to attempts to suspend them 
without positive drug test results); Dick Patrick, Jones’ Attorney: Drug Agency Has No 
Compelling Evidence, USA TODAY, May 25, 2004, at 1A (discussing objections by attorney for 
Olympic track gold medalist Marion Jones that the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency improperly 
sanctioned her for doping without an admission of drug use or a positive urine sample). 
 105. INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, MEDICAL: THE FIGHT AGAINST DOPING & 
PROMOTION OF ATHLETES’ HEALTH, July 2004, at 1, http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/ 
en_report_838.pdf. 
 106. Steroids (Anabolic-Andgrogenic), NIDA INFO FACTS, (National Institute on Drug 
Abuse), March 2005, at 1, http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/Infofacts/Steroids05.pdf [hereinafter 
NIDA]. 
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  For women—growth of facial hair, male-pattern baldness, changes in or 
cessation of the menstrual cycle, enlargement of the clitoris, deepened voice. 
  For adolescents—growth halted prematurely through premature skeletal 
maturation and accelerated puberty changes.  This means that adolescents risk 
remaining short for the remainder of their lives if they take anabolic steroids 
before the typical adolescent growth spurt.107 
NIDA also mentions risks of HIV/AIDS and hepatitis from injections, 
aggression, psychiatric side effects, such as mood swings, depression, paranoid 
jealousy, extreme irritability, delusions, impaired judgment, and dependency 
on heroin to counteract insomnia and irritability.108 
These assessments have been reinforced in Congressional hearings on 
steroids.  Senator Jim Bunning (R-Ky.), a former baseball player, testified: 
So it’s important for the American public to understand just how harmful 
steroids can be to someone’s health.  Side effects of steroid use include fatal 
conditions like liver cysts, liver cancer, blood clotting, hypertension and can 
even lead to heart attack and stroke and many other bad things.  Baseball has 
helped to open a Pandora’s box and now there’s a chance to fix that damage 
and educate the public on the terrible health effects of steroids.109 
Parents described how their sons had committed suicide on account of steroids: 
20 short months ago, our youngest son, Taylor, took his own life.  He was 2 
weeks away from beginning his senior year in high school . . . . 
  . . . I am absolutely convinced that Taylor’s secret use of anabolic steroids 
played a significant role in causing the depression, the severe depression that 
resulted in his suicide.  And I have also learned that the events leading up to 
and including Taylor’s suicide are right out of the medical textbook on 
steroids.110 
Olympic gold medalist Carl Lewis testified: 
We have heard many stories.  One that I can focus on, just recently, I believe, 
was a West German female athlete who at one point had taken up to 40 
steroids, different types of steroids and different types of drugs.  She had so 
much scar tissue and such a reaction in her hip, her buttocks and her hip area, 
that they couldn’t even get needles in her skin.  They were breaking off in her 
skin.  She ultimately died from steroid use.  So we are talking about someone 
who went completely crazy, taking injections, injections, injections, one after 
another.  That area was as hard as a rock.  They couldn’t even put a needle in 
it. 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1–2. 
 109. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 2, at 56 (statement of Sen. Jim 
Bunning). 
 110. Id. at 118 (testimony of Donald M. Hooton). 
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Athletes have died.111 
Still, the truth regarding the health risks associated with doping is less 
clear.  Many of the adverse health effects attributed to steroids stem from oral 
use of a class of compounds known as the 17-α-alkylated steroids.112  These 
compounds indeed can cause elevations in liver enzymes and an increased risk 
of liver cancer.113  But these effects are due to the fact that orally ingested 
compounds are broken down in the liver.  The same results are not true of 
injected steroid compounds.114  Some studies have suggested that anabolic 
steroids raise blood pressure, but the effects were transitory.115  One study 
found that steroids produced changes in echocardiograms,116 and another saw 
changes that could indicate a predisposition to arrhythmias, which can produce 
sudden death.117  Studies also report a decrease in high density lipoproteins 
(“good” cholesterol) and an increase in low density lipoproteins (“bad” 
cholesterol), but this is mainly the case with oral steroids and the levels return 
to normal once steroid use is discontinued.118  Moreover, some research shows 
that anabolic steroids beneficially increase lipoprotein-a (LPa), which 
promotes cardiovascular health.119 
Steroids are hormones, and the steroids that build muscles are versions of 
the male hormone, testosterone.  As a consequence, they are both anabolic—
i.e., muscle-building—and androgenic—that is, they produce masculine 
physical characteristics.  Over the years, efforts have been made to isolate the 
anabolic from the androgenic effects, but without success.120  As a result, 
anabolic steroids in women produce acne, voice deepening, hair loss, breast 
reduction, and enlargement of the clitoris.121  In males, anabolic steroids 
suppress the natural production of hormones.  This can cause testicular 
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atrophy, decreased sperm production, sperm irregularities, and gynaecomastia 
(male breast development).122  The effects in males are usually reversible once 
steroid use is discontinued; in females, the changes may be harder to 
reverse.123  In terms of psychiatric effects, the evidence is equivocal.  Some 
studies report effects on mood and aggression; others do not.124 
Researchers have attempted to study mortality among steroid users.  An 
oft-cited experiment in mice found that adult males given anabolic steroids for 
six months at doses comparable to those taken by bodybuilders had a 4.3 
percent increase in mortality and that a year after exposure 52 percent of them 
had died compared with only 12 percent of the controls.125 Another study 
found that power lifters had a mortality rate of 12.9 percent over 12 years 
compared with 3.1 percent of the general population, but this study did not 
confirm that the subjects had used steroids, did not measure the amount, if any, 
and did not control for other substances and behaviors.126 
What is most striking about all of this research is that virtually none of it is 
definitive. There are no long-term, double-blind, randomized, placebo-
controlled investigations of steroid use by athletes.  Much of the data, 
including anecdotal reports, or observational studies in which the subjects’ use 
of steroids, as well as other potentially dangerous substances that would 
confound the results, is unconfirmed and unmeasured.  This has led some 
researchers to conclude that the health hazards of steroids have been 
overstated, that serious health effects are rare, and that the most common side 
 
 122. Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 112, at 535–536. 
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effects are reversible and benign.127  Others conclude that the only adverse 
effects firmly supported by experimental data are potentially unfavorable 
effects in blood lipid profiles and an increased risk for mood changes and 
aggression.128  In fact, only one reported study actually administered injected 
high doses of anabolic steroids (600 mg. per week of testosterone enanthate) to 
human subjects and compared the effects with a control group.  The 
investigators found that steroids significantly increased muscle size and 
strength and produced no adverse effects; however, the treatment period lasted 
only ten weeks.129 
Of course, the lack of definitive data on long-term anabolic steroid use 
does not mean that steroids are safe for athletes.  There are some disturbing 
indications in the literature.  Even lawfully manufactured compounds 
administered under a doctor’s supervision may entail some health risks.  More 
importantly, athletes may be using illicit preparations with uncertain identity, 
strength, and purity, and at extremely high and widely varying dosages.130  
Athletes also continue to use both oral and injectable steroids, potentially 
exposing them to the greater potential for liver toxicity associated with the oral 
compounds. 
Yet an enormous number of persons are reported to be using steroids. One 
account puts the number of U.S. athletes using steroids at between one and 
three million.131  A noted expert on steroid use found that 29.3 percent of 
college football players and 20 percent of college track-and-field athletes 
admitted using the substance.132  Thirty-three percent of elite power athletes 
and competitive bodybuilders interviewed by questionnaire and 55 percent 
interviewed by phone admitted to steroid use.133  The National Institute of 
Drug Abuse claimed in 1999 that half-a-million eighth and tenth graders were 
using steroids.134  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
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estimates that one million adolescents have used or are using steroids.135  Girls 
are reported to be using steroids, not just to enhance athletic performance, but 
also “to get the toned, sculpted look of models and movie stars.”136  During a 
1999 hearing, one congressman testified: “[W]e are seeing a public health 
crisis with respect to these drugs in American youths.  It seems that now the 
same number of kids using some kind of steroid, is the number that are using 
cocaine.”137 
Moreover, athletes are subject to frequent and thorough medical 
examinations.  All but one state high school athletic association, and 97 
percent of colleges and universities, require prospective athletes to undergo a 
preparticipation physical examination (PPE).138  Fifty-one percent of colleges 
and universities require annual PPEs.139  PPEs also are standard for 
professional players.140  Although laboratory tests are not routine for the PPE, 
the examinations include an extensive medical history (with specific questions 
designed to screen for susceptibility to common athletic health risks) and a 
physical examination.141  Given how rampant anabolic steroid use is believed 
to be, and how long many athletes have been using steroids, one would expect 
to see far more frequent reports of serious health problems among athletes if 
steroids were as hazardous as NIDA and others make them out to be. 
Not only may the dangers of steroids be exaggerated, but there are other 
factors that undermine the persuasiveness of the safety rationale.  In the first 
place, society already tolerates a substantial amount of danger in sports.  It is 
estimated that from July 2000 to June 2001, 4.3 million people visited hospital 
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emergency rooms for nonfatal, sports- and recreation-related injuries.142  In 
males, basketball, bicycle, and football injuries were the most frequent.143  If 
people really wanted athletes to be safe, they would either eliminate dangerous 
sports or change the rules, like prohibiting the use of rigid hockey sticks and 
requiring professional boxers to wear much more protective helmets or much 
more highly-cushioned gloves.  True, changing the rules in this way could alter 
the fundamental nature of the sports.  But the fact that we allow these sports to 
be fundamentally dangerous shows that we are not fundamentally interested in 
safety.  More importantly, it begs the question of why the risks of being injured 
playing the sport are deemed acceptable but the risks from enhancements are 
not. 
The most telling argument against the safety rationale against doping, 
however, is that sports prohibit even the use of safe drugs.  Andreea Raducan, 
a Romanian gymnast, was stripped of her gold medal at the 2002 Olympics 
because she took two over-the-counter cold pills.144  For many years, the 
Olympics banned caffeine in concentrations in excess of twelve micrograms 
per milliliter of urine.145  A 150-pound person would need to ingest about 600 
milligrams of caffeine to exceed the twelve microgram level.146  This is the 
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the Olympics and placed it in its Monitoring Program, meaning that athletes will continue to be 
tested for the substance so that WADA can monitor patterns of use and restore the substance to 
the banned list if warranted.  WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, THE 2005 MONITORING PROGRAM 
(2005), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/Monitoring_Program_ 
2005.pdf [hereinafter WADA MONITORING LIST].  Pseudoephedrine is under scrutiny in the 
United States because it is used to manufacture methamphetamine.  Support Grows for Law 
Restricting Sale of Cold Medicines, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 2005, at 10.  A number of states have 
passed laws requiring pharmacies to place over-the-counter drugs containing the ingredient 
behind the pharmacy counter and limiting the number of pills that an individual may purchase.  
Id. 
 145. INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE BOARD, OLYMPIC MOVEMENT 
ANTI-DOPING CODE APPENDIX A, § I.A.a. (2003), available at http://www.medycyna 
sportowa.pl/download/doping_code_e.pdf.  WADA placed caffeine on its 2005 Monitoring 
Program.  WADA MONITORING LIST, supra note 144.  For a description of this program, see 
supra note 144. 
 146. See Mark S. Juhn, Popular Sports Supplements and Ergogenic Aids, 33 SPORTS MED. 
921, 925 (2003). 
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equivalent of one sixteen-ounce cup of Starbucks coffee plus a couple of 
Mountain Dews.147 
In short, protecting athletes’ health is not an adequate explanation for the 
war against doping.  Any doubt about this has been dispelled by WADA itself.  
In 2003, WADA replaced the three rationales originally given by the Olympic 
Medical Commission for banning doping148 with three criteria for determining 
when a substance should be banned: (1) “[i]t is performance-enhancing,” (2) 
“[i]t represents a risk to the health of the athlete,” and (3) “[i]t is against the 
spirit of sport.”149  Significantly, WADA declared that only two of the three 
criteria needed to be satisfied in order for a substance to be banned.150  
Consequently, even substances that do not represent a risk to athletes’ health 
can be banned so long as they enhance performance and are “against the spirit 
of sport.” 
Just because safety is neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor to explain 
the war on doping does not make it irrelevant, however.  Although the health 
risks from steroids and other performance-enhancing substances may be 
exaggerated, they nevertheless may be substantial, especially if athletes use 
underground preparations of uncertain identity, strength, and purity, at 
uncontrolled dosages, without proper medical supervision, over extended 
periods of time.151 Although there seems to be a striking dearth of documented 
 
 147. See Barbara F. Harland, Caffeine and Nutrition, 16 NUTRITION 522, 523, 524 (2000).  
The safety of caffeine is well-established.  See Terry E. Graham, Caffeine and Exercise: 
Metabolism, Endurance and Performance, 31 SPORTS MED. 785, 804 (2001); Juhn, supra note 
146, at 925–26. 
 148. See INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, supra note 105, at 1. 
 149. In-Depth: Prohibited List, ATHLETE’S PASSPORT (World Anti-Doping Agency), Apr. 
2004, at 2, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/April_04.pdf. 
 150. Id. 
 151. The main adverse effects associated with HGH injections are insulin resistance, glucose 
intolerance, decreased endogenous HGH secretion, carpal tunnel syndrome, water retention, and 
potential cardiovascular effects.  Juhn, supra note 146, at 931; Paul J. Jenkins, Growth Hormone 
and Exercise, 50 CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY 683, 686 (1999).  These risks are mainly 
extrapolated from observations of patients with acromegaly, characterized by excessive 
endogenous production of growth hormone (GH) of up to 100 times the normal amount, due to 
pituitary dysfunction.  Jenkins, supra, at 686.  Little is known about the adverse effects of the 
long-term use of HGH by athletes.  Christer Ehrnborg et al., Growth Hormone Abuse, 14 
BAILLIERE’S CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 71, 74 (2000).  The usual dose for 
adult GH-deficient patients is 1–2 IU/day.  Id. at 73.  Athletes have been reported to use 
supraphysiological dosages as high as 10–25 IU/day, but the mean dose appears to be around 4 
IU/day.  Id.  Presently, the most common adverse effects noted among these users are excessive 
sweating and fluid retention.  Id. at 74–75; see also Karel Van Loon, Safety of High Doses of 
Recombinant Human Growth Hormone, 49 HORMONE RES. 78, 80–81 (1998).  Another concern 
is the use of oral dietary supplements and black market products purporting to be HGH or “HGH 
precursors.”  See Juhn, supra note 146, at 930–31.  These may contain dangerous ingredients, and 
products that actually contain HGH may be contaminated with agents that can cause 
Creutzfeld-Jacob or other diseases.  Id. at 931.  Excessive amounts of EPO can raise hemoglobin 
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reports of steroid toxicity in modern athletes, it is conceivable that long-term, 
high-dose use could produce latent adverse effects that would not become 
apparent until many years had passed.  Moreover, it is a truism of 
pharmacology that no drug is completely safe.  Even fairly benign substances 
like caffeine can be lethal if ingested in sufficient quantities,152 and even 
modest risks may not be worth taking.  In short, drug safety is a relative 
concept: a drug is safe if its risks are outweighed by its benefits.153 
Some would say that, in the case of performance-enhancing drugs in 
sports, the outcome of this risk/benefit analysis is clear: the risks never can be 
outweighed by the benefits simply because there are no benefits, or at least, no 
socially accepted benefits.  Obviously, this would be true if doping were 
against the rules; there can be no socially recognized benefit from breaking the 
rules, any more than there can be from a substance that makes it easier to 
commit crimes, assuming that it accomplished nothing else of social value.  
But this Article does not assume that doping is against the rules; instead, it asks 
whether it should be.  Could doping provide any benefit, assuming it was not 
against the rules?  Or, to put it another way, why might a sport allow athletes 
to use performance-enhancing drugs? 
a. Better Playing 
One reason athletes might be permitted to use performance-enhancing 
drugs would be to help them play better: runners could run faster or longer 
distances, shooters and archers could hit more bulls-eyes, weightlifters could 
snatch greater weights, and so on.  Allowing players to play better clearly is a 
legitimate goal of sports, as it is the fundamental reason for coaching, training, 
and practice.154  Moreover, it is clear that better technology is one legitimate 
 
levels to the point that the blood actually thickens dangerously, especially during exercise, when 
sweating decreases blood viscosity.  W. Jelkmann, Use of Recombinant Human Erythropoietin As 
an Antianemic and Performance Enhancing Drug, 1 CURRENT PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECH. 11, 
24 (2000).  This condition can increase the risk of heart problems and blood clots.  Tokish et al., 
supra note 22, at 1548.  EPO is suspected in the deaths of five Dutch cyclists in 1987 and of 
eighteen other cyclists between 1997 and 2000.  Id. 
 152. The acute lethal oral dose of caffeine for adults is estimated to be between five and ten 
grams, depending on the individual.  Juan A. Carrillo & Julio Benitez, Clinically Significant 
Pharmacokinetic Interactions Between Dietary Caffeine and Medications, 39 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOKINETICS 127, 133 (2000).  Achieving this dose would require consuming 50–100 
cups of coffee per day, assuming a cup of coffee contained 100 milligrams of caffeine.  Id.  
Although death from excessive caffeine intake is rare, it has occurred after suicidal or accidental 
ingestion of large amounts of caffeine.  Id. 
 153. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND 
RESEARCH, BENEFIT VS. RISK: HOW CDER APPROVES NEW DRUGS 1, http://www.fda.gov/ 
cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-5.pdf. 
 154. Opponents of doping might assert that coaching, training, and practice allow athletes to 
make the most of their natural talents, while drugs give them unnatural abilities.  But the fact that 
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way to enable players to play better.  Hence, there has been increased interest 
in high-tech sports training equipment and sports psychology,155 not to mention 
in the development of better equipment, such as fiberglass pole-vault poles, 
super-sized tennis racquets, and TechZilla softball bats.156  Nor is there 
anything illegitimate about the fact that, unlike training and equipment, drugs 
are taken internally.  So is food, and yet an important part of an athlete’s 
preparation is proper diet, often regulated by experts in accordance with state-
of-the-art nutritional science.  Indeed, one of the classic ways to enhance 
athletic performance is “carbohydrate loading,” in which the athlete consumes 
 
a talent is “natural” does not give it any superior moral status, because athletes have done nothing 
to deserve their natural talents.  Oddly, it seems to be precisely the absence of merit that makes 
philosopher Michael Sandel revere natural talent, which he calls “the gifted character of human 
powers and achievements.”  Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: What’s Wrong with 
Designer Children, Bionic Athletes, and Genetic Engineering, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 
2004, at 51, 54.  Furthermore, performance-enhancing drugs may be used to supplement rather 
than replace natural talents.  Doping opponents also might claim that athletes who gained an 
advantage from drugs, even though they might be able to run faster, jump farther, and so on, 
were, by definition, not playing “better.”  But if drugs enable athletes to do these things, then in 
what sense can the athletes not be said to be performing “better”?  One possibility is that they 
have not earned the improvement in performance, as they would have if it resulted, for example, 
from harder training.  But many of the ingredients of an athlete’s performance are unearned, 
including, as stated above, natural talent.  Critics of doping may have in mind a notion similar to 
Peter Kramer’s argument in Listening to Prozac that anti-depressants make you feel different, but 
not better.  See PETER D. KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC xix (1993). But either this is 
tautological (greater speed caused by drugs is, by definition, not greater speed), or, as explained 
below, it is an expression of aesthetic value which says nothing more than that doping opponents 
find drugs unappealing.  See discussion infra Part II.B.7. 
 155. See B. Donohue et al., Improving Athletes’ Perspectives of Sport Psychology 
Consultation, 28 BEHAV. MODIFICATION 182 (2004) (discussing the effectiveness of interview 
methods); Daniel S. Kirschenbaum et al., Effects of Differential Self-Monitoring and Level of 
Mastery on Sports Performance: Brain Power Bowling, 6 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 335 
(1982) (assessing the effectiveness of methods on improving bowling scores); Joannie M. Schrof 
et al., The Winning Edge: The High-Tech Gizmos, Training Wizardry, and Special Diets That 
Propel Olympians to Glory, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 29, 1996, at 38 (describing new 
Olympic imaging and performance-analyzing equipment). 
 156. Pole vault poles originally were made of bamboo, but the game switched to fiberglass 
poles in the early 1960s, resulting in significantly higher vaults.  John Jerome, Physics at the Bar, 
5 SCIENCE 84, 85 (1984).  Oversized tennis racquets were introduced in the 1970s and have a 
playing surface that is about 50 percent larger than traditional racquets.  Tom Herman, 
Navratilova Notwithstanding, Rage in Tennis Game Is a Bigger Racquet, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 
1980, at 35.  Some expert players think that the larger racquets are more powerful, provide a 
greater margin of error, give players a longer reach, and are more intimidating.  Id.  TechZilla 
bats have twin, multi-braced aluminum walls to enable slow-pitch softball batters to hit balls 
farther distances.  Brendan I. Koerner, Ready for Hardball Softball, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2004, § 
3 (Business), at 2. 
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a large amount of carbohydrates before competition.157  The question is why 
sports refuse to allow athletes to take drugs to improve performance when they 
permit them to do all these other things. 
b. Leveling the Playing Field 
A second reason sports might permit athletes to use performance-
enhancing drugs might be to help level the uneven playing field created by 
differences in natural talent or luck.  Often, these differences, rather than the 
athletes’ effort or determination, dictate who succeeds.  Yet athletes have done 
nothing to merit these advantages, and therefore do not deserve to benefit from 
them.158  This is why many sports segregate competitors into classes based on 
 
 157. Carbohydrate loading is a technique commonly used by endurance athletes to improve 
performance during high intensity exercise lasting longer than sixty to ninety minutes.  Carbo-
Loading: Boost your Endurance During High-Intensity Workouts, CNN.COM, Nov. 30, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/library/HQ/00385.html.  It works by increasing the amount of 
glycogen stored in the muscles.  Id.  When carbohydrates are digested, they are converted into 
sugar to provide energy to the cells.  Id.  Excess sugar not used by the cells is stored in the liver 
and muscles as glycogen.  Id.  Normally, the body stores only small amounts of glycogen, which 
are depleted after sixty to ninety minutes of exercise, causing fatigue.  Id.  Before a major 
endurance event, athletes will taper the amount of exercise to conserve glycogen stores while at 
the same time increasing carbohydrate consumption to force the body to store more glycogen, 
thus boosting endurance during extended high intensity exercise.  Id.  It is a very common 
practice among distance runners and other endurance athletes, as it tends to be most effective with 
extended periods of high-intensity exercise.  Id. 
 158. This is not the same as saying that the advantages conferred by natural talent or luck are 
unfair, however.  One of the possible reasons that sports, not to mention society in general, allow 
people to profit from that which they have done nothing to deserve is that the distribution of 
talent and luck is presumed to be random (except by those who believe that they are gifts from 
God).  Since in theory anyone could have been born with natural talent or be lucky, it is not unfair 
to let these factors be ingredients for success. 
  The notion that random distribution is fair is ingrained in American jurisprudence and 
ethics.  In an early case addressing how to select which persons to jettison from an overcrowded 
lifeboat, the court recommended drawing lots, stating: “[W]e can conceive of no mode so 
consonant both to humanity and to justice.”  U.S. v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1842).  
Courts also have approved lotteries as a constitutionally permissible method for allocating scarce 
public housing and liquor licenses.  Holmes v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 
1968) (housing); Hornsby v. Allen, 330 F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1964) (liquor licenses).  The 
possibility of random reward arguably is a major factor in sustaining religious superstition and in 
maintaining sharp inequalities of wealth; people believe that random rewards come from God, 
and the poor view state lotteries as “the only possibility for breaking out of the cycle of poverty.”  
Ronald P. Keeven, Pros and Cons of Gambling Amendment: Money Used for Legalized Betting 
Drains Resources of the Poor, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 27, 1994, at 3B. 
  As it happens, obtaining natural talent from one’s genes is not completely random: 
athletes’ children are more athletically gifted than other children, especially when both parents 
are athletic.  See Hermine H. M. Maes et al., Inheritance of Physical Fitness in 10-yr-old Twins 
and Their Parents, 28 MED. & SCI. SPORTS & EXERCISE 1479, 1479 (1996).  Twin studies 
indicate that performance-related fitness characteristics (such as static strength and running 
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weight, age, or experience.159  In the same fashion, athletes could take 
performance-enhancing drugs to compensate for natural deficiencies or bad 
luck.160 
One problem with this approach is that athletes with natural talent or good 
luck also could avail themselves of drugs, thereby maintaining their 
advantages.  A related objection is that, if one athlete took drugs, all would 
have to, just to stay even.  The combined result would be a sort of futile arms 
race: everyone would be subject to the drug risks without obtaining any 
offsetting benefit.  But these criticisms assume that enhancements would affect 
everyone to the same degree—producing, for example, a fifty-pound increase 
in weightlifting ability across the board.  This is not necessarily, or likely, to be 
the case, because people tend to react somewhat differently to biological 
interventions.161  Even if all athletes used drugs, a competitor might hope that 
he or she would derive a greater advantage than the next person.  But more 
importantly, the same criticism can be lodged against all efforts to improve 
athletic performance. If training for many hours every day enables all athletes 
to improve, for example, why bother? The athletes would be just as well off if 
no one practiced; but sports do not prohibit training, even though training 
causes injuries. The question, then, is whether the risks of drugs are 
 
speed) and health-related characteristics (such as flexibility and maximum oxygen uptake) are 
moderately to highly heritable.  Id. at 1479.  Several studies have focused on locating specific 
genes for athleticism, with most of the candidates affecting cardiac function.  See, e.g., George 
Gayagay et al., Elite Endurance Athletes and the ACE I Allele—The Role of Genes in Athletic 
Performance, 103 HUM. GENETICS 48 (1998); H. E. Montgomery et al., Human Gene for 
Physical Performance, 393 NATURE 221 (1998); Bernd Wolfarth et al., A Polymorphism in the 
Alpha2a-Adrenoceptor Gene and Endurance Athlete Status, 32 MED. & SCI. SPORTS & EXERCISE 
1709 (2000).  Advances in genetic science are likely to make the distribution of natural talent 
increasingly less random.  As noted earlier, there now is a genetic test for different types of 
running prowess; this test could be administered to early-stage embryos fertilized in vitro and the 
results employed to select which embryos to implant in the womb.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 36–37. 
 159. An interesting question is why other sports do not.  Someone once tried to form a 
basketball league for players of normal height, but the attempt ultimately failed.  See Elizabeth 
Comte, WBL: A Short Circuit with a Worldwide Reach, SPORTING NEWS, May 21, 1990, at 44. 
 160. One of the original justifications put forward by the Olympic Medical Commission for 
banning doping was “maintaining equal opportunities for all at the time of competition.”  See 
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, supra note 105, at 1.  It also is curious that the original 
rationale spoke in terms of “maintaining” equal opportunities.  It can be argued that athletes never 
are equal at the moment of competition.  Some are born with greater natural abilities.  Some have 
wealthy parents, or the good luck not to become injured.  Not every Olympic gymnast can be 
trained by Bela Karoli; not every figure skater is able to grow up like Sarah Hughes, practicing on 
her personal backyard ice rink.  See Jeff Metcalfe, Poised at the Top, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Feb. 9, 
1992, at G1; Linda Robertson, Hughes Continues to Win Fans as She Balances Demands of 
Skating, Being 16, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 6, 2002, at 1D. 
 161. Ultimately, pharmacogenetics may enable these differences in drug response to be 
determined in advance. 
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sufficiently great, or greater than the risks of other methods of improving 
performance, so that drugs should be treated differently.  Perhaps this would 
validate banning the use of extremely dangerous drugs, but it certainly does not 
justify a ban on all substances. 
One solution to the futility problem would be to establish a true 
handicapping regime that permitted only disadvantaged athletes to use drugs, 
and only in sufficient amounts to offset their lack of talent or luck.  This would 
require methods to identify and measure advantage and disadvantage, which 
are likely to be at least as expensive and intrusive as the testing regimes 
employed to detect the use of banned substances.162  But perhaps this would be 
tolerable in the interest of equality. 
Of course, the system would not be fair if enhancements were not available 
to everyone. If they were too costly or the supply was too limited regardless of 
how much athletes were willing to pay, so that only some athletes were 
fortunate enough to obtain the performance advantages, the use of 
enhancements could exacerbate, rather than alleviate, inequality.  Currently, 
this does not seem to be much of a problem.  Athletes do not complain that 
only some of them have access to certain substances.  If anything, the drugs are 
too readily available.  But a fairness problem could arise in the future if 
especially expensive or exotic enhancements were developed.  In that case, the 
goal of equality might require subsidies so that all competitors could avail 
themselves of these substances, or a ban so that none could. 
c. Increasing Fan Appeal 
A third potential benefit from performance-enhancing drugs could be 
increased value for fans.  A substantial number of baseball fans, for example, 
do not strongly object to the use of steroids because it enables batters to hit 
more home runs.  According to a 2005 poll, fans cited the outlandish salaries 
of players as the biggest problem facing baseball, followed by steroids, and 
then ticket prices.163  When asked directly by journalists about his views on 
 
 162. A deliciously wicked depiction of handicapping the talented is provided by Kurt 
Vonnegut in the short story Harrison Bergeron, which begins: 
The year was 2081, and everybody was finally equal.  They weren’t only equal before 
God and the law.  They were equal every which way.  Nobody was smarter than anybody 
else.  Nobody was better looking than anybody else.  Nobody was stronger or quicker 
than anybody else.  All this equality was due to the 211th, 212th, and 213th Amendments 
to the Constitution, and to the unceasing vigilance of agents of the United States 
Handicapper General. 
KURT VONNEGUT, JR., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7, 7 (1968). 
 163. Associated Press, Fans Frown on High Pay: Salaries Rank Above Steroids in Latest 
Poll, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Apr. 5, 2005, at C5. 
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steroids, and specifically Mark McGwire’s congressional testimony,164 Mike 
Davidson, the fan who retrieved McGwire’s record-tying sixty-first home run 
ball, replied, “It’s no big deal.  Like he said, it’s in the past.  It really doesn’t 
matter.”165  Indeed, more runs may sell more tickets and raise advertising 
revenue. 
Even if drugs created serious health risks, participants might take them to 
enhance fan appeal.  Clearly much of the risk inherent in sports is tolerated, if 
not encouraged, for this purpose.  For many spectators, it is the anticipation of 
beholding injury and even death that makes them watch sports events.  Think 
of automobile or downhill ski racing, even football and hockey, not to mention 
boxing.  These sports easily could be made much safer: cars could have 
governors set at low speeds, more speed control gates could be placed on 
downhill ski runs, tackle football could be replaced with touch, and so on.  But 
these safety measures would make the sporting events less exciting and less 
remunerative. 
In summary, performance-enhancing drugs may yield cognizable benefits: 
allowing players to play better, compensating for deficiencies in natural talent 
and luck, and boosting fan appreciation.  The question, then, is whether these 
benefits outweigh the risks. 
This question is hard to answer because of the lack of efficacy and safety 
information on doping substances.  As noted above, the only study on the use 
of anabolic steroids by athletes found that they increased muscle mass, but the 
study only lasted ten weeks.166  Similarly, little information is available about 
the safety and efficacy of HGH as a performance-enhancer in sports.167  
Moreover, this lack of information is perpetuated by doping critics and 
bioethicists who maintain that it would be unethical to conduct studies in 
human subjects on the safety and efficacy of banned substances.168  This stance 
 
 164. Former St. Louis Cardinal Mark McGwire, rather than address whether he had in fact 
taken steroids during his career, consistently responded to Congressional questioning that he was 
“not here to talk about the past.”  Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 2, at 242. 
 165. Gary Smith, Steroids and Baseball: What Do We Do Now?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 
28, 2005, at 40 (conducting extensive interviews with fans who were integrally involved in Mark 
McGwire’s and Sammy Sosa’s home run contest in 1998). 
 166. Bhasin et al., supra note 124, at 1–2.  The treatment period lasted 10 weeks, but the 
study included a 4-week control period and a 16-week recovery period.  Id. 
 167. The few controlled studies that have been conducted on the effect of HGH in athletes 
have not shown that it has a significant positive effect on muscle growth or strength.  See 
Matthias M. Weber, Effects of Growth Hormone on Skeletal Muscle, 58 HORMONE RES. 43, 46 
(2002).  Although HGH appears to increase lean body mass in non-HGH deficient individuals, 
this is attributable to water retention rather than to an increase in lean muscle mass.  Id. at 45.  
Moreover, athletes may not inject actual HGH but ingest “precursor” substances, which are 
ineffective since HGH is broken down when orally administered.  Juhn, supra note 146, at 930. 
 168. See, e.g., Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 112, at 517 (“Because of ethical 
considerations, only relatively low doses for a limited time period can be studied.”). 
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is an artifact of the belief, described earlier, that doping cannot have a 
legitimate purpose, and therefore, a priori, there is no possible benefit that 
could offset any risks.  If, as argued in the forgoing Sections, this argument is 
fallacious, there would seem to be no valid reason to maintain this embargo. 
2. Ethics of Sport 
A second reason put forth by the Olympic Medical Commission in 1967 
for banning doping in sports was “[d]efending medical and sports ethics”169 
and WADA continues to cite “against the spirit of sports” as a ground for 
prohibiting particular substances.170 
Numerous sociologists and philosophers have attempted to describe the 
ethics or “spirit” of sport in order to identify what performance aids should and 
should not be permitted.  Thomas Murray argues that doping is incompatible 
with what we admire about sports.171  According to this view, sports only value 
certain inputs: determination, effort, natural talent, and luck.  An athlete who 
wins because she is driven to succeed, puts in endless hours of training and 
practice, has innate athletic ability, and enjoys the good fortune, say, of having 
wealthy, supportive parents and of avoiding injury, is entitled to her medal.  
She is being “authentic.”172 
Yet as the earlier discussion shows, the use of performance-enhancing 
substances in sports has a long tradition.173  In fact, it is only in the last fifty 
years or so that the notion that drug use is incompatible with sports has become 
fashionable.174  Moreover, even now there are many sports that do not ban 
doping (because they do not test athletes).  These include some highly 
 
 169. See INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, supra note 105, at 1. 
 170. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  Under WADA’s approach, some 
performance-enhancing substances presumably would be consistent with the spirit of sports, but 
WADA gives no clue as to how identify them.  Based on the current list of prohibited substances, 
permitted substances would seem to include food, vitamins, some dietary supplements, and 
certain gases.  See generally WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE: THE 
2005 PROHIBITED LIST: INTERNATIONAL STANDARD (2005) [hereinafter WADA 2005 
PROHIBITED LIST], available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/list_2005.pdf.  
The permissible gases category is the basis for nitrogen tents and houses, which manipulate the 
ratios of gases in the atmosphere to reproduce artificially the effects of sleeping at altitude.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 22–23. 
 171. See Thomas H. Murray, The Ethics of Drugs in Sports, in DRUGS AND PERFORMANCE IN 
SPORTS 11, 15 (Richard H. Strauss, ed. 1987) (“[D]rugs and other performance aids should be 
banned because they do not reflect the forms of human excellence that sports are intended to 
honor.”). 
 172. See Erik Parens, Authenticity and Ambivalence: Toward Understanding the 
Enhancement Debate, 35 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 34, 35 (2005) (“[W]e are authentic when we 
exhibit or are in possession of what is most our own: our own way of flourishing or being 
fulfilled.”). 
 173. See discussion supra Part I. 
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 49–65. 
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organized events, such as certain “powerlifting” and “strongman” 
competitions,175 as well as virtually all intramural and informal 
competitions.176  These sports may not make players rich or command high 
advertising revenues, but they are clearly valued. 
Another reason why drugs are against the spirit of sports, it can be said, is 
that they eliminate the need for hard work.  Being unearned, the argument may 
go, doping victories are neither achieved nor deserved.  Some argue that 
“[v]ictory is inextricably linked to rules.  It is questionable whether the drug 
taking athlete has competed in the first place.”177  But many of the ingredients 
of victory in sports, including natural talent, wealthy and indulgent parents, 
and good luck, are not earned.  An important factor in winning Olympic and 
World Cup alpine skiing events, for example, is having the best equipment.  
Racing ski manufacturers test their skis on speed tracks and dole out the fastest 
to racers based on the racers’ international ranking and, it seems, favoritism.178  
For years, for example, the Atomic Ski Company gave first pick to the 
Austrian team.179  Moreover, athletes may have acquired the money to buy 
enhancements through hard work and self-sacrifice.  In addition, the user must 
decide what tasks to undertake, and the decision to do something praiseworthy, 
 
 175. Several powerlifting organizations do not test any athletes, or have separate test and non-
test divisions.  The International Powerlifting Association (IPA) has an “amateur” division that 
tests for steroids and a “professional” division that does not.  INTERNATIONAL POWERLIFTING 
ASSOCIATION, BY-LAWS 9, http://www.ipapower.com/Forms/IPABY-LawsComplete2.pdf.  The 
IPA bylaws state that any individual in the amateur division found to have a positive drug test 
will be moved into the professional division.  Id.  Similarly, the World Powerlifting Congress and 
the American Powerlifting Federation do not test for anabolic substances, but have offshoot 
organizations, the Amateur World Powerlifting Congress and the Amateur American Powerlifting 
Federation, with identical rules except that they conduct drug testing.  World Powerlifting 
Congress, http://worldpowerliftingcongress.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2006); Amateur American 
Powerlifing Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.apf-illinois.com/FAQ.html (last visited Jan. 
8, 2006).  Other organizations that have both tested and non-tested divisions include the World 
Powerlifting Alliance/American Powerlifting Association and the United States Powerlifting 
Federation.  Powerlifting Federation Rule Cross Reference Chart, http://www.weighttrainer 
sunited.com/fedreference.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).  The World Powerlifting Organization is 
strictly non-tested.  Id. 
 176. The CDC estimates that as many as 150 million Americans participate in some form of 
physical leisure activity outside of organized sports.  CDC REPORT, supra note 142, at 736. 
 177. SIMON GARDINER ET AL., SPORTS LAW 304 (2d ed. 2001). 
 178. See Bill McCollom, Speed Jumps: Why Fast Skis Matter and How the U.S. Team Got 
‘Em, Sept. 29, 2003, FRANCONIA SKI CLUB, http://www.franconiaskiclub.com/PDFs/Speed%20 
jumps%20and%20fast%20skis.pdf. 
 179. Id.  McCollom explains that U.S. racers began to obtain improved access to the top pairs 
of skis after the U.S. Ski and Snowboard Association “made the commitment to provide our 
servicemen more opportunity to go to the factories and establish relationships; we allotted more 
time and resources for testing; we hired personnel to help coordinate service from the factories.”  
Id.  As a result, U.S. racer Daron Rahlves received second pick behind Austrian Stephan 
Eberharter.  Id. 
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rather than, say, to use the drugs to commit crimes or for other forms of ill-
gotten gain, confers merit.  In any event, individuals are likely to have to 
expend considerable effort to produce results even if they take enhancement 
drugs.  Athletes who take steroids, for example, still must work very hard to be 
competitive.  Indeed, one effect of drugs may be to enable athletes to train 
harder without injuring themselves.  In that sense, the drugs can make it 
possible to work more, not less. 
3. Protecting Children 
A third rationale that has been asserted lately, particularly in congressional 
hearings on the use of steroids in professional sports, is the need to discourage 
the use of performance-enhancing drugs by children.  As Rep. John Sweeney 
(R-NY) testified, for example: 
As athletes have become more creative; turning to substances such as andro 
and its muscle-building cousins, our children have become more susceptible to 
the allure of performance-enhancing substances.  While the integrity of sports 
is significant, the use of steroids in sports would not be of such profound 
concern if it did not impact children so drastically.180 
In some cases, the objection to the use of performance-enhancing drugs by 
children is based on what appear to be sound safety concerns.  Adolescents 
using anabolic steroids, for example, may experience irreversible early closure 
of growth plates.181  Clearly it would be appropriate to prevent young people, 
who are presumed to lack the capacity to make informed, rational choices, 
from engaging in especially risky behaviors.  But note that this rationale could 
apply to many common sports that children routinely engage in, including 
tackle football, hockey, and skateboarding.  Moreover, there may be some 
performance-enhancing drugs that do not pose serious health risks, even for 
children.182 
 
 180. Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004 Hearing, supra note 134, at 6 (statement of Rep. 
John Sweeney). 
 181. Hartgens & Kuipers, supra note 112, at 536. 
 182. It is unclear whether researchers ever would be allowed to test performance-enhancing 
drugs in children.  The “Common Rule,” which establishes the ethical and regulatory norms for 
human subjects research in the U.S., states that research on minors which does not pose more 
than minimal risk is permitted so long as the researchers obtain parental permission and the 
minors give their assent.  45 C.F.R. § 46.404.  Research on minors that poses more than minimal 
risk is permitted only if it holds out the prospect of direct benefit for the individual subject, and 
then only if the institutional review board finds that the risk is justified by the anticipated benefit 
to the subjects.  Id. § 46.405. 
  Parents traditionally have had broad latitude to enhance the lives of their children.  From 
a legal standpoint, the only prohibition is against actions that would constitute child abuse or 
neglect.  The question, then, is whether enrolling a child in a study of performance-enhancing 
drugs would amount to abuse or neglect.  In a recent case, a Maryland court ruled that children 
could not be enrolled in any non-therapeutic study that presented any risk of injury or damage to 
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Another concern with children in particular is that the use of performance-
enhancing drugs could lead to the use of illicit recreational drugs.  As Senator 
Joseph Biden (D-Del.) stated in 1989 hearings on steroid use in football: 
[A]s experts have told us, and we will hear today and in future hearings, 
steroids could become another “gate-way drug,” a phrase that’s now being 
used.  “Gate-way” drug refers to marijuana, cocaine and other drugs.  If young 
people accept the idea that using steroids to build their body is okay, they may 
be all the more likely to try other drugs to alter their minds, as well as their 
bodies.183 
There are no data to substantiate this concern, but it stands to reason that 
children who perceived that there were benefits from using one type of 
prohibited substance would be more likely to use other types.  On the other 
hand, the problem may be with the illicit status of the performance-enhancing 
drugs rather than with the fact that they improve performance.  Children 
 
health.  Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 850 (Md. 2001).  Nor could parents 
lawfully consent to their participation.  Id. at 858.  Subsequently, the court issued a clarification 
stating that it had intended to ban only pediatric research that posed “any articulable risk beyond 
the minimal kind of risk that is inherent in any endeavor.”  Id. at 862.  However, the court went 
on to note that the study in question—intended to identify economically feasible ways of 
protecting children from lead poisoning—could not proceed because it did not have a therapeutic 
objective: “The context of the statement was a non-therapeutic study that promises no medical 
benefit to the child whatever, so that any balance between risk and benefit is necessarily 
negative.”  Id.  The court clearly implied that, because enhancement research promises no 
medical benefit to the child, it would be unethical to carry out enhancement research on children 
unless the study posed no risk whatsoever.  The court’s position in Grimes seems to be in accord 
with the position of the American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
in regard to genetic enhancement, which states that it would be unethical to attempt to genetically 
enhance children unless there was “no trade-off with other characteristics or traits.”  American 
Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues Related to Prenatal 
Genetic Testing, 3 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 633, 633 (1994). 
  The need to consider the research status of children in performance enhancement studies 
is heightened by the fact that minors already are the subjects of considerable informal 
enhancement experimentation.  See, e.g., Sean Esteban McCabe et al., Prevalence and Correlates 
of Illicit Methylphenidate Use Among 8th, 10th, and 12th Grade Students in the United States, 
2001, 35 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 501 (2004).  Parents, for example, are reported to ask 
physicians to prescribe HGH for their children although the children do not meet the labeling 
indications for the drug, and the use of amphetamine (Adderall) and methylphenidate (Ritalin) as 
study aids by students who do not suffer from ADHD is widely reported.  Id.; Christian J. Teter et 
al., Illicit Methylphenidate Use in an Undergraduate Student Sample: Prevalence and Risk 
Factors, 23 PHARMACOTHERAPY 609, 609 (2003); Rebecca L. Weber, A Drug Kids Take in 
Search of Better Grades, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 30, 2004, at 11. 
 183. Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports—The Medical and Social Costs of Steroid 
Abuse: Hearings on The Steroid Abuse Problem in America, Focusing on the Use of Steroids in 
College and Professional Football Today Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2 
(1989) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] DOPING IN SPORTS AND THE USE OF STATE POWER 45 
receive all sorts of legitimate medications without, it seems, concluding that if 
one type of drug is good, all drugs must be good. 
But even if it made sense to restrict the use of performance-enhancing 
drugs by children, why ban their use by adults?  Adults are permitted to engage 
in all sorts of behaviors that are deemed bad or deleterious for children, such as 
drinking, smoking, or sex.  The main reason to single out athletes is that they 
serve as role models for kids.  For example, the chair of the House committee 
investigating steroid use in baseball in 2005 commented: “Our primary focus 
remains on the message being sent to . . . children who play baseball, children 
who idolize and emulate professional baseball players.”184  But even role 
models are entitled to personal freedoms.  So long as the adults make it clear 
that the rules are different for adults and children, and so long as role models 
such as professional athletes do not actively promote enhancements, such as in 
television ads, it is unclear why they should be prohibited from using 
enhancements but permitted to engage in other adult activities.  As a ski 
patroller, one of the Authors deals with lots of injured youngsters who “just 
wanted to see if they could do that flip like the guy on TV.”  This does not 
mean that we have to eliminate freestyle skiing from the Olympics. 
In many cases, parents and others who bridle at the notion of children 
using performance-enhancing drugs to be competitive are concerned not only 
by the use of drugs but by the highly competitive, even cut-throat endeavor 
that many juvenile sports activities have become.  This is truly a sad state of 
affairs, and it is not clear how to go about correcting it.  But given that we live 
increasingly in a winner-take-all society, a legitimate question arises why those 
who do not have a great deal of natural talent or good luck should be barred 
from using biomedical enhancements to compete more successfully against 
those who do. 
To summarize, a blanket prohibition against doping in sports cannot be 
justified on the basis of safety concerns, sports ethics, or even protecting 
children.  It might be tempting to conclude, therefore, that those in charge of 
sports are just being arbitrary, that they are singling out performance-
enhancing drugs for no real reason.  But it is important to realize that it is 
perfectly acceptable for the rules of sports to be arbitrary.  A sport must have 
rules to be a coherent activity, and must be played within the rules for it to 
have meaning as a sport.185  As a child, you may have tried to play a game in 
which the individual players made up the rules to suit them as they went; no 
doubt you quickly abandoned it in frustration at its pointlessness.  Think of the 
 
 184. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 2, at 3 (statement of Chairman Tom 
Davis). 
 185. The same is true of games. 
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Queen of Heart’s croquet game in Alice in Wonderland.186  Furthermore, the 
rules of sport can be, and often are, completely arbitrary.  Why does baseball 
only permit nine players in the field, for example, instead of five or eleven? 
But this still leaves open the question of why sports have chosen to ban the 
use of drugs. Even if it is difficult to identify reasons that justify it, are there 
factors that may explain it? 
4. The War on Drugs 
As described earlier, the effort to halt the use of doping began in the mid-
1960s with the formation of the Olympic Medical Commission, which 
established the Olympic drug testing program.187  This timing reveals one 
impetus for the anti-doping campaign: The war against doping started out to a 
large extent as part of the wider “War on Drugs.”  It is no coincidence that the 
Olympic Medical Commission was created around the same time that Richard 
Nixon became President with a pledge to suppress the youth-oriented drug 
culture.188  Nor is it happenstance that WADA’s list of banned substances 
includes recreational drugs such as marijuana, as well as drugs that enhance 
performance.189  Thus, British Olympic gold medalist Mark Lewis-Francis lost 
his silver medal from the 2005 European Indoor Track-and-Field 
Championships after he tested positive for marijuana;190 a runner with a 
positive marijuana test was disqualified from the U.S. 400-meter relay team at 
the Athens Olympics;191 and, most notably, Canadian snowboarder Ross 
Rebagliati lost and then regained his gold medal in snowboarding at the 1998 
Nagano Olympics (which led to the formal addition of marijuana to the list of 
banned substances).192 
5. The Cold War 
Another key motivation for the campaign against doping was the Cold 
War.  International competition between East and West carried over to the 
sports arena; recall the elation when the American hockey team beat the 
 
 186. See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 59–65 (Project 
Gutenberg ed., The Millennium Fulcrum Edition 3.0 1994) (1865). 
 187. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
 188. See Kate Doyle, Operation Intercept: The Perils of Unilateralism, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE, 
Apr. 13, 2003, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86. 
 189. See WADA 2005 PROHIBITED LIST, supra note 170, at §§ S1–S9. 
 190. David Martin, Lewis-Francis Avoids Ban for Failed Dope Test: British Sprinter Denies 
Cannabis Use, But Loses Medal, THE SCOTSMAN (Gr. Brit.), May 14, 2005, at 20. 
 191. Bill Ward, Capel Admits Mistake, Moves Forward, TBO.COM, Aug. 29, 2004, 
http://olympics.tbo.com/olympics/MGBIPXKOGYD.html. 
 192. Associated Press, Olympics: Marijuana Becomes Banned Substance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
28, 1998, at C5. 
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Soviets at Lake Placid.193  A main factor in the success of communist bloc 
athletes was the use of steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs.  In the 
mid-1970s, communist nations began aggressive, state-sponsored doping 
programs.194  Combined with a rigorous talent screening system, doping 
programs in Eastern Europe were remarkably successful in producing 
champion athletes.195  The programs were organized at the highest levels of 
government and included not just coaches and trainers, but the secret police 
and nationalized pharmaceutical companies.196  At the 1976 Montreal 
Olympics and 1988 Seoul games “the Soviet team had a hospitality ship used 
as medical centre to ensure that Soviet competitors were ‘clean’ at the last 
moment.”197  The Olympics cracked down on doping when it became apparent 
that victorious Warsaw Bloc athletes, especially the East Germans, were more 
flagrantly and successfully employing steroids than other teams.198 
But the Cold War is over, while the war on performance-enhancing drugs 
persists. 
6. Nostalgia 
Another incentive for banning drugs in sports is nostalgia.  People yearn 
for a simpler time when star athletes like Babe Ruth broke records without the 
use of steroids.199  As former pitcher Senator Jim Bunning stated: 
 
 193. See Joe Lapointe, Impossible Dream Plus One Decade: 10 Years After U.S. Gold-Medal 
Effort, Victors and Losers Play Side by Side, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1990, at C1. 
 194. Alan Cowell, In a Cold War Hangover, Germany Confronts a Legacy of Steroids, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1998, § 8 (Sports), at 1. 
 195. See WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 142. 
 196. Id. at 143–44. 
 197. JAMES RIORDAN, SPORT, POLITICS AND COMMUNISM 123 (1991). 
 198. See WADA Anti-Doping History, supra note 12. 
 199. Of course, since there were no drug tests at the time, it is impossible to know whether 
Ruth or other athletes were using other substances to enhance performance.  A related objection 
to the use of performance-enhancing drugs is that it confounds record-keeping in sports.  As 
Senator John McCain stated in 2004: “The failure to insist on stringent drug testing policies 
damages the integrity of the games, calls into question records set by those suspected of using 
performance-enhancing drugs, and puts in peril the health of the athletes who play the games.”  
Steroid Use in Professional and Amateur Sports: Hearing on S. 253 Before S. Comm. on Com., 
Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong. (2004), http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id= 
1100&wit_id=2191.  Yet, the same problem arguably occurs every time a major change is made 
in the rules, including allowing the use of improved equipment.  Pole-vaulting apparently has 
been able to cope with the introduction of fiberglass poles in the early 1960s, even though 
competitors were suddenly able to vault much greater heights and old records were rendered 
obsolete.  See supra note 156 and accompanying text.  Similarly, baseball fans have dealt with the 
results of the designated-hitter rule, although not without grumbling.  See Mel Antonen, DH at 
30: Hit, Miss: Rule Has Increased Offense and Extended Careers, but Some Say Time Has Come 
for AL to Get Rid of It, USA TODAY, July 14, 2003, at 1C; Bill Dawson, DH at 30: Rule Still 
Enrages Purists, but Many Hitters Relish Role, S.D. UNION-TRIB., May 12, 2003, at C2. 
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Mr. Chairman, maybe I’m old fashioned.  I remembered players didn’t get any 
better as they got older.  We all got worse.  When I played with Henry Aaron 
and Willie Mays and Ted Williams, they didn’t put on 40 pounds and bulk up 
in their careers and they didn’t hit more home runs in their late 30’s than they 
did in their late 20’s.200 
Senator Byron Dorgan put it this way: “Tragically, what once was a ‘field of 
dreams’ may deteriorate into a quagmire of controlled substances . . . .”201 
Yet as the history of doping shows, drug use was the norm in the past, 
rather than the exception.202  Evidently there was a halcyon period when many 
older Americans came of age in which the use of drugs was unremarked, if not 
absent.  Even if the belief that sports in the past were drug-free is an illusion, it 
may be a comforting illusion at a time of rapid and unsettling technological 
change.  Some nostalgia buffs prefer to try to hit targets with Civil War-type, 
black powder rifles.  Continued opposition to the use of drugs in sports may be 
an attempt to preserve a world as lost in time as the muzzle-loading 
sharpshooters of the Civil War. 
7. Aesthetics 
Another key explanation for the opposition to the use of performance-
enhancing drugs in sports, however, is aesthetics.  People simply find the idea 
of athletes using drugs ugly.  In part, this is a reaction against graphic images 
of drug use.  The initial crackdown on steroids, for example, had a lot to do 
with the rumors of syringes scattered across locker room floors in the Olympic 
villages of the 1950s.203  The toughening of testing programs in the 1980s 
probably was due not only to the desire to stop Warsaw bloc teams from 
continuing their string of victories, but to the repulsive masculine appearance 
of some of their female athletes who were taking steroids.204 
This is not to demean the importance of aesthetics.  Aesthetics enables us 
to identify what is beautiful.  It ignites powerful emotions, as evidenced by the 
vitriolic language used by sports writers to describe the steroid scandal in 
baseball, who called it “a blot on baseball”205 and characterized it as being 
worse than the Black Sox scandal of 1919, the Pittsburgh cocaine trials in 
 
 200. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 2, at 57. 
 201. Press Release, Sen. Byron L. Dorgan, Opening Statement at Senate Hearing Looking 
Into Reports of Steroid Use in Baseball (June 18, 2002), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/ 
hearings/061802dorgan.pdf. 
 202. See discussion supra Part I. 
 203. See James B. Jacobs & Bruce Samuels, The Drug Testing Project in International 
Sports: Dilemmas in an Expanding Regulatory Regime, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
557, 562 (1995). 
 204. See ALLEN GUTTMANN, THE OLYMPICS: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN GAMES 146 
(2002). 
 205. Editorial, Steroids a Blot on Baseball, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 7, 2004, at 18A. 
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1985, and Pete Rose gambling on games while managing the Cincinnati 
Reds.206  Distastefulness certainly can kill a sport; witness what happened to 
XFL football.207  Aesthetic opposition by fans also blocked a plan to place 
Spiderman 2 logos on baseball bases.208 
But it is important to realize the difference between aesthetic objections 
and moral objections.  It would be wrong to smuggle a modern weapon into a 
Civil War-type, black powder rifle shooting competition.  Yet there is nothing 
wrong with conducting shooting matches using modern guns.  Similarly, there 
is nothing inherently wrong with allowing the use of performance-enhancing 
drugs in sports. 
III.  THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
If the use of drugs in sports ultimately cannot be deemed immoral, what is 
the proper role of the government in enforcing the ban on doping?209 
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Scandal Won’t Go Away, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 2004, at 1C. 
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Benched, Taste Wins, SEATTLE TIMES, May 15, 2001, at B4. 
 208. See Michael McCarthy, Sports and Entertainment are Double-Teaming Fans, USA 
TODAY, June 16, 2005, at 1C. 
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(1951).  Five years later, the Daniels Amendment further revised penalties.  Pub. L. No. 84-728, 
70 Stat. 567 (1956). 
  The United States also began working in earnest with the international community to 
address the perceived ills of drug abuse.  In 1961, the United Nations promulgated the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, an international treaty which criminalized the manufacture and 
trafficking of drugs.  Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ 
convention_1961_en.pdf (last visted Jan. 8, 2006).  Whereas previous treaties only controlled 
specific substances (like opium), the Single Convention consolidated those treaties and added 
cannabis to its list of banned substances.  Id. at Preamble, Art. 28.  The United States’ compliance 
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A. Rationales 
What justifies the government’s intervention in the war against doping?  
More specifically, is there a need for government involvement when there are 
sports organizations to establish and police anti-doping programs? 
1. Safety 
The government would be justified in getting involved in the war against 
doping if sports organizations were not adequately protecting athletes’ safety.  
When Juan Samaranch was president of the IOC, for example, there were 
numerous complaints that he was not serious enough about enforcing the 
Olympic ban on doping.210  Lax rules and enforcement were major themes 
during the Congressional hearings about steroids in professional sports. 211 
 
with the treaty eventually took the form of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA).  Pub. L. 
No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801–971 (2000)). 
  Prior to the enactment of the CSA, Congress recognized the growing need to address 
non-narcotic substances.  The Drug Abuse Control Amendments were enacted to deal with 
problems caused by abuse of stimulants, depressants, and hallucinogens.  Pub. L. No. 89-74, 79 
Stat. 226 (1965).  Enforcement was also being stepped up, with new powers given to the Justice 
Department.  The FDA Bureau of Drug Abuse Control and the Treasury Department Bureau of 
Narcotics were transferred to the Department of Justice to form the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs, effectively consolidating drug policing.  Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug 
Law History, supra.  The CSA served to give these new agencies something to consistently 
enforce.  It specifically designated drugs (including opiates, coca, cannabis, stimulants, 
depressants, and hallucinogens) into five different schedules, regulating access and establishing 
penalties for misuse.  21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000).  The CSA, which is still in force, brought the 
United States into compliance with the UN treaty and has been widely copied by the states.  
Amendments have been added to specifically control certain classes of drugs, particularly 
psychotropics.  Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 37-68 (1978) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 
801a (2000)).  Since the enactment of the CSA, Congress has acted to increase penalties and deal 
with designer drugs.  Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).  Congress has also created various 
offices to address the problems associated with drug abuse, including the Drug Enforcement 
Administration in 1973, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy in 1988.  Drug 
Enforcement Administration, http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/dea.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 
2006) (establishment of DEA); Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (establishment of 
Office of National Drug Control Policy).  It has also taken a hard line towards anabolic steroids.  
Although not originally included in the Controlled Substances Act, anabolic steroids have been 
subject to increasing regulation with both the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-647, 104 Stat. 4851, and the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-358, 118 
Stat. 1661. 
 210. See, e.g., Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs, supra note 137, at 1 (statement of 
Sen. John McCain) (“Revelations about the use of performance enhancing drugs have served to 
both expose the complexity of the challenge of detection and enforcement of drug policies, and 
the gross shortcomings of the existing United States Olympic Committee and the International 
Olympic Committee efforts to address the challenge.”); Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden) 
(“[T]he International Olympic Committee has announced and then failed to actually follow 
through on concrete plans to curb doping.  They have talked, yet again, about initiating changes 
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An interesting question is why sports might not do enough to protect 
athletes’ health.  If steroids are in fact dangerous, then it should be an 
important function of governing bodies to protect athletes from such hazards.  
Unfortunately, politics has largely prevented the regulation of doping, 
particularly by the IOC.  Juan Samaranch was accused of ignoring doping 
among Chinese athletes in exchange for a Nobel Peace Prize nomination.212  
Also, an important factor in professional sports is the collective bargaining 
power of the athletes themselves.  Yet it is curious that players would resist 
strong doping controls if steroids and other performance-enhancing substances 
were as dangerous as some make them out to be.  One explanation is that the 
players are concerned primarily with the procedural fairness of the anti-doping 
system.  Despite the introduction of a new anti-doping hierarchy (led by 
WADA) in 1999,213 athletes are still critical of the testing process, as it 
 
for the 2000 games, but my sense is that nobody should stay up waiting to see these reforms 
actually put in place.”). 
 211. See, e.g., NBA Hearing, supra note 8, at 2. 
But we are still left with some questions, given the fact that the NBA’s testing program 
has some “Shaq-sized” holes in it: How do we know for sure there is no steroid problem if 
testing policies aren’t that strong?  If there is little or no upside to using steroids in 
basketball, shouldn’t the NBA then have the strongest of all the sports? . . . 
  . . . What we are trying to understand is a policy that tests all non-rookies just once a 
year, and not at all during the regular season; trying to understand the policy under which 
a first steroids offense results in a mere five-game suspension, the equivalent of 6% of the 
regular NBA season.  Compare that to the NFL, where the first offense is punished by a 
suspension of four games, or 25% of the regular season.  This is a difference in the impact 
on a player’s pocketbook, where it probably hurts the most and has the most enforcement. 
Id. (statement of Chairman Tom Davis). 
We need to know if the policy is adequate in terms of how the tests are done and the 
punishments and the scope.  As Mr. Waxman and I wrote to Major League Baseball and 
the Players Association yesterday, there are real doubts about this new policy and all that 
it’s cracked up to be. . . . 
  Over the years, there have been a consistent drip, drip, drip of information about 
steroids in baseball with not much of a response from Major League Baseball.  After all, it 
was in large part due to congressional pressure that the current policy took shape. 
Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime, supra note 2, at 3 (statement of Chairman Tom Davis). 
Like I said before, I think the new policy that suspends players for steroid use is a baby 
step forward.  Personally, I think the penalties are really puny.  I would like to see much 
stronger ones.  One-month suspension for a first offense and from what I have read today, 
that isn’t really what happens.  A year for a second.  And then 1-month suspension for a 
first offense is what it should be, a year for a second and then the third strike and you are 
out, out of the game. Football has a much stronger penalty and everyone agrees its 
program has worked. 
Id. at 55 (statement of Sen. Jim Bunning). 
 212. See Galluzzi, supra note 85, at 97–98. 
 213. World Anti-Doping Agency History, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?page 
Category.id=253 (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
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frequently does not give them the opportunity to refute doping allegations.214  
Some have sued to challenge their tests and suspensions, arguing that they 
were unfairly forced to bear the burden of proof and suspended without 
hearings.215  Another explanation is that players are not convinced that doping 
is dangerous, or that they are willing to take the risks in return for the rewards 
of playing better. 
The benefits of doping also undoubtedly motivate professional team 
owners and leagues to resist stringent anti-doping programs.  These benefits 
include greater fan appeal from better playing, especially from more 
spectacular performance such as hitting more home runs. 
Government concern for the safety of players is especially appropriate 
when the players are not in a position to balance risks and benefits for 
themselves.  One group to which this applies is juveniles.  Therefore, it is 
certainly appropriate for government-run sports organizations—that is, public 
school and state university sports programs—to ban dangerous doping by 
minors.216 
On the other hand, the government is not justified in using the concern 
about doping in sports as a pretext for extending the war on drugs beyond 
constitutionally permissible boundaries.  In 1991, when James Acton entered 
the seventh grade at the Washington Grade School in the tiny logging town of 
Vernonia, Oregon, he decided he wanted to play football.217  To his and his 
parents’ surprise, he was told that he had to agree to undergo drug testing.218  
He would be tested at the beginning of the season, and randomly thereafter, not 
for steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs, but for marijuana, 
cocaine, and amphetamines (which, although used for performance 
enhancement, were targeted by the school primarily because of recreational 
abuse).219  Upon being notified of a test, James would have to produce a 
specimen at a urinal in the presence of an adult monitor, who would watch and 
listen for the normal sounds of urination (Girls were allowed to use a closed 
stall while the monitor listened outside and then checked to see that the sample 
was at body temperature).220 
 
 214. See, e.g., Longman, supra note 104, at D1; Sprinter Wants Public Dope Hearing, CBS 
NEWS, June 16, 2004, www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/31/national/main633257.shtml. 
 215. See Michael S. Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process 
in International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523 (2002) (discussing the changes implemented in the 
Sydney Olympics and comparing the new system to the pre-Sydney system).  Straubel concludes 
that while the new system offers better due process protections for athletes, it still fails to offer 
athletes wide-ranging protection.  Id. at 570–72. 
 216. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (detailing child protection rationale for ban on doping). 
 217. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 651 (1995). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 649, 650. 
 220. Id. at 650. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
54 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:15 
James and his parents sued the school district to block the testing 
program.221  They argued that in previous cases, the United States Supreme 
Court had made it clear that government entities, including public schools, 
could not conduct random drug testing.222  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the 
parents, but the Supreme Court reversed its decision and held that public 
schools could randomly test student-athletes.223 
In its decision, the Supreme Court described the link between illicit drug 
use and athletes’ psychological and physical safety.224  In the Court’s opinion, 
safety risks were especially great in sports: 
Finally, it must not be lost sight of that this program is directed more narrowly 
to drug use by school athletes, where the risk of immediate physical harm to 
the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high.  
Apart from psychological effects, which include impairment of judgment, slow 
reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain, the particular drugs 
screened by the District’s Policy have been demonstrated to pose substantial 
physical risks to athletes.  Amphetamines produce an “artificially induced 
heart rate increase, [p]eripheral vasoconstriction, [b]lood pressure increase, 
and [m]asking of the normal fatigue response,” making them a “very 
dangerous drug when used during exercise of any type. . . .” Marijuana causes 
“[i]rregular blood pressure responses during changes in body position,” 
“[r]eduction in the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood,” and “[i]nhibition of 
the normal sweating responses resulting in increased body temperature. . . .”  
Cocaine produces “[v]asoconstriction[,] [e]levated blood pressure,” and 
“possible coronary artery spasms and myocardial infarction.”225 
The Court also pointed out that drug use by student athletes could impel other 
students to use illegal drugs: “It seems to us self-evident that a drug problem 
largely fueled by the ‘role model’ effect of athletes’ drug use, and of particular 
danger to athletes, is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes do not 
use drugs.”226 
Justice O’Connor, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, 
however, was not convinced that the connection between illicit drug use and 
school athletics was strong enough to pass constitutional muster: 
I find unreasonable the school’s choice of student athletes as the class to 
subject to suspicionless testing—a choice that appears to have been driven 
 
 221. Id. at 651–52. 
 222. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 652; See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 
489 U.S. 656, 678–79 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 223. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 651, 664–66. 
 224. Id. at 661. 
 225. Id. at 662 (quoting Jerald Hawkins, Drugs and Other Ingesta: Effects on Athletic 
Performance, in MANAGING SPORTS AND RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 90, 90–94 (Herb 
Appenzeller ed., 1993). 
 226. Id. at 663. 
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more by a belief in what would pass constitutional muster . . . than by a belief 
in what was required to meet the District’s principal disciplinary concern.  
Reading the full record in this case, as well as the District Court’s authoritative 
summary of it, . . . it seems quite obvious that the true driving force behind the 
District’s adoption of its drug testing program was the need to combat the rise 
in drug-related disorder and disruption in its classrooms and around campus.  I 
mean no criticism of the strength of that interest.  On the contrary, where the 
record demonstrates the existence of such a problem, that interest seems self-
evidently compelling.  “Without first establishing discipline and maintaining 
order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students. . . .”  And the record in 
this case surely demonstrates there was a drug-related discipline problem in 
Vernonia of “epidemic proportions. . . .”  The evidence of a drug-related 
sports injury problem at Vernonia, by contrast, was considerably weaker.227 
Sure enough, in 2002, the Court abandoned all pretense of linking drug tests to 
school sports when it upheld suspicionless drug tests for children involved in 
all extracurricular activities.228 
If it is nevertheless legitimate for the government to seek to protect the 
health of student athletes on the basis that they are not mature enough to make 
risk/benefit decisions for themselves, then what about adult athletes?  Certainly 
the government is entitled to maintain a regulatory system for assuring drug 
safety and efficacy.  It is illegal, for example, for someone to manufacture and 
distribute a drug that has not been shown, to the satisfaction of the Food and 
Drug Administration, to be safe and efficacious for its intended purpose.229  
Once a drug is approved for one purpose, however, it is lawful to use it for any 
other purpose.230  Thus, physicians are allowed to prescribe approved drugs for 
so-called “off-label” (i.e., unapproved) purposes,231 and non-physicians can 
use non-prescription drugs as they see fit.  The only exception is in the case of 
substances regulated by the Controlled Substances Act, which limits lawful 
uses to legitimate medical purposes.232  As noted earlier, in 1990, Congress 
placed anabolic steroids on the list of substances controlled under that Act.233  
At the same time, it enacted the following curious provision in the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: 
[W]hoever knowingly distributes, or possesses with intent to distribute, human 
growth hormone for any use in humans other than the treatment of a disease or 
 
 227. Id. at 685 (citations omitted). 
 228. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002). 
 229. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000). 
 230. David A. Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of Human Drugs for Nonapproved Uses 
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 693, 695 (1978). 
 231. Id. 
 232. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2005) (“A prescription for a controlled substance to be effective 
must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual 
course of his professional practice.”). 
 233. See supra note 209. 
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other recognized medical condition, where such use has been authorized by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 355 of this title and 
pursuant to the order of a physician, is guilty of an offense punishable by not 
more than 5 years in prison, such fines as are authorized by title 18, or both.234 
This language implies that physicians cannot prescribe HGH for an 
unapproved purpose, since such a purpose is not “authorized by the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services under section 355” (i.e., an indication approved 
in labeling for a new drug).  If this interpretation is correct, this provision 
would constitute an unprecedented intrusion into physicians’ prescribing 
authority.  Unfortunately, this language was added at the end of congressional 
deliberations over the Crime Control Act of 1990 and there is absolutely no 
legislative history to explain what Congress intended.235 
As noted earlier, a primary concern raised by doping in sports is the lack of 
safety data.236  A major justification for government regulation of drug safety 
in general is that it is far more efficient for the government to collect, analyze, 
and disseminate information about drug safety than to expect individuals to do 
this for themselves.237  Therefore, the government clearly has an interest in 
promoting the use of safe and effective performance-enhancing drugs.  But as 
mentioned, many commentators currently consider it unethical to experiment 
on humans to determine the safety and efficacy of such substances.238  This 
view hampers the ability of the government to regulate these substances, and 
robs athletes of the ability to make informed decisions. 
One reason why the government may be concerned about the ability of 
adult athletes to make risk/benefit decisions for themselves is the pressure they 
face to excel.  This concern is reinforced by a survey that one writer conducted 
of world-class athletes in which more than half of the nearly 200 competitors 
interviewed responded that they would take a drug that would enable them to 
win every competition for five years and then kill them.239  On top of self-
motivation, athletes may face overwhelming pressure from trainers, coaches, 
teammates, and competitors.  For example, Ben Johnson’s coach at the time he 
 
 234. 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (emphasis added). 
 235. See discussion supra note 3 identifying the unexplained change from the proposed 
language of § 333(e)(1) to its final enacted version.  The FDA has issued regulatory warnings to 
manufacturers and distributors of HGH and HGH-related dietary supplements under § 303(h), but 
has not taken any action against physicians who prescribe HGH for unapproved uses.  See, e.g., 
Letter from Michael A. Chappell, Department of Human and Health Services, to Tony Sires, 
Global Internet Alliance (Feb. 18, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g4543d.htm). 
 236. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
 237. Robert T. O’Neill, Regulatory Perspectives on Data Monitoring, 21 STATISTICS MED. 
2831, 2831 (2002). 
 238. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 239. Do Athletes Really Want Killer Drugs, SPORTSLETTER (Amateur Athletic Found., L.A., 
Cal.), Dec. 2003,  http://www.aafla.org/10ap/SportsLetter14-4/SLhome.html.  Though as the 
newsletter explains, some critics deride the survey as unscientific.  Id. 
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was stripped of his 1988 Olympic gold medal for testing positive for steroids 
repeatedly stressed that athletes cannot succeed in highly competitive 
environments without the use of drugs,240 and no doubt he impressed this view 
on Johnson.  Success on the playing field also may be a ticket to higher 
education and the rewards of professional sports.  Athletes from poorer 
backgrounds may be especially vulnerable.241 
Yet as discussed earlier, the real risks from performance-enhancing drugs 
do not seem to be substantially greater than other risks from sports.242  
Moreover, there are many costly things that athletes must do as part of their 
training regimen in order to succeed.  They must give up sleep, certain foods, 
relaxation, recreation, and certain relationships.  They must risk their bodily 
integrity.  They must relinquish a considerable amount of their privacy.  They 
must undergo drug testing. 
In any event, adults presumably have a choice about whether or not to be 
athletes.  If people do not want to put up with the risks of enhancement drugs, 
they can refrain from playing sports, just like someone who does not want to 
risk injury from football simply can avoid going out for the team. 
2. Aesthetics 
If a major objection to performance-enhancing drugs in sports is based on 
aesthetics rather than on protecting health or morals, then a serious question 
arises about the legitimacy of government intervention.  While Congress 
undoubtedly has the constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate biomedical enhancements that travel in interstate commerce,243 and 
while states can exert their police power to control individual behavior, purely 
aesthetic regulation raises serious questions about the limits of state power. 
During the early 20th century, courts generally had a hostile view toward 
aesthetic regulation.  Courts felt that regulations based on aesthetics were too 
subjective to justify a state’s use of the police power and had difficulty 
accepting the view that aesthetic considerations, as a reflection of beauty, 
 
 240. See Randy Starkman, Can Johnson Come Back? TORONTO STAR, Jan. 5, 1991, at B1. 
 241. Athletics scholarships presently are offered for baseball, basketball, crew (rowing), 
cross-country, fencing, football (American), golf, gymnastics, ice hockey, indoor track, lacrosse, 
skiing, soccer, softball, swimming and diving, tennis, track and field, volleyball, water polo, 
women’s field hockey, and wrestling.  First Point Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.firstpointusa.com/faqs.php (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).  Scholarships in archery, 
badminton, bowling, equestrian sports, and squash are available to women only.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court has made it clear that even the most desperate individuals can be prohibited from 
using unapproved drugs.  See U.S. v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555–56 (1979) (“For the 
terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or physical 
injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit.”). 
 242. See text accompanying supra note 142–43. 
 243. The Supreme Court recently confirmed this broad authority in upholding federal controls 
on medical marijuana.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005). 
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could overcome the difficulty of basing regulations on such a vague and 
subjective standard.244  An Ohio Supreme Court case contains a frequently 
cited example of the rationale behind the judicial reluctance to recognize 
aesthetic regulation as valid: 
Certain Legislatures might consider that it was more important to cultivate a 
taste for jazz than for Beethoven, for posters than for Rembrandt, and for 
limericks than for Keats.  Successive city councils might never agree as to 
what the public needs from an aesthetic standpoint, and this fact makes the 
aesthetic standard entirely impractical as a standard for use restriction upon 
property.  The world would be at continual seesaw if aesthetic considerations 
were permitted to govern the use of the police power.245 
Some courts began to uphold regulations with an aesthetic component if 
they found that the law was plausibly related to the traditional health, safety, or 
welfare motivations for government intervention.  These dual purpose laws 
were upheld if the non-aesthetic purpose fit within the traditional definition of 
the police power.246  Courts would often engage in a legal fiction in finding a 
traditional police power justification for laws that seemed obviously designed 
to achieve a primarily aesthetic objective.  One early case upheld an ordinance 
banning billboards in certain areas, not on the basis that they were unsightly, 
but rather on the basis that they provided a hiding place for criminals and a 
shelter for illegal activities.247 
During this period, similar decisions gave the traditional anti-aesthetic rule 
an increasingly narrow interpretation.248  Judges upheld regulations with a 
significant aesthetic component as long as the regulation was found to promote 
the health, safety, or general welfare.249  Judicial opposition to aesthetic 
regulation focused on laws that were enacted entirely on the basis of 
aesthetics.250 
A major shift in aesthetic jurisprudence came in 1954 with the Supreme 
Court decision of Berman v. Parker.251  Although the case involved the 
government’s eminent domain power regarding an urban renewal project in 
Washington, D.C., the opinion contained in dictum a famous passage 
 
 244. Mark Bobrowski, Scenic Landscape Protection Under the Police Power, 22 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 697, 703–04 (1995). 
 245. City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 148 N.E. 842, 844 (Ohio 1925). 
 246. James Charles Smith, Law, Beauty, and Human Stability: A Rose is a Rose is a Rose, 78 
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indicating that aesthetic considerations are within the purview of the police 
power: 
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values it 
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.  It is 
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be 
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as 
carefully patrolled.252 
This passage is credited with ushering in the modern era of judicial acceptance 
of regulations based solely on aesthetic considerations.253  Beginning in the 
1960s a number of state courts began to uphold the view that regulations could 
be based primarily on aesthetic considerations.254  One commentator has noted 
that “Berman’s expansive statements continue as a beacon to every court 
considering the propriety of aesthetic zoning.”255 
One of the earliest and most often cited state court cases to adopt the 
modern view of aesthetic regulation was People v. Stover.256  The case 
involved a property owner who had erected an unsightly clothesline filled with 
old rags in his front yard to express his dissatisfaction with increased city 
taxes.257  The city subsequently enacted an ordinance prohibiting clotheslines 
in front and side yards.258  The court held that the ordinance was constitutional 
despite doubts about the city’s proffered motives of traffic and fire safety, 
stating that 
it is our opinion that the ordinance may be sustained as an attempt to preserve 
the residential appearance of the city and its property values by banning, 
insofar as practicable, unsightly clotheslines from yards abutting a public 
street.  In other words, the statute, though based on what may be termed 
aesthetic considerations, proscribes conduct which offends sensibilities and 
tends to debase the community and reduce real estate values.259 
The rule announced in Stover began to spread to other jurisdictions, and 
aesthetic regulations have been most frequently enacted in the context of 
junkyards, signs or billboards, and architectural review regulations.260 
 
 252. Id. at 33 (internal citations omitted). 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
60 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:15 
Often when a court upholds a regulation based “purely” on aesthetic 
considerations, another rationale is cited to back up the position.  In Stover, the 
court mentioned maintaining property values as a supporting reason for 
upholding the “purely aesthetic” ordinance prohibiting clotheslines.261  A later 
New York decision upholding a local zoning ordinance prohibiting certain 
types of billboards declared that its decision did not mean that any aesthetic 
consideration suffices to justify prohibition and that “[t]he exercise of the 
police power should not extend to every artistic conformity or non-
conformity.”262  Rather, the court felt that state power should be limited to 
those aesthetic considerations that have a substantial bearing on the “economic, 
social, and cultural patterns of a community or district.”263  Several 
commentators have also noted the frequency with which other justifications are 
cited in upholding regulations on a “purely aesthetic basis.”264  However, this 
is not always the case, as some courts have explicitly rejected the idea that 
aesthetic regulations must be linked to some other purpose in order to be 
sustained as valid.265 
Modern courts are undoubtedly much more inclined to uphold regulations 
based primarily on aesthetics.  Another often-cited opinion describes the trend 
as follows: 
However, there is a growing judicial recognition of the power of a city to 
impose zoning restrictions which can be justified solely upon the ground that 
they will tend to prevent or minimize discordant and unsightly surroundings.  
This change in attitude is a reflection of the refinement of our tastes and the 
growing appreciation of cultural values in a maturing society.  The change may 
be ascribed more directly to the judicial expansion of the police power to 
 
 261. Stover, 191 N.E.2d at 274. 
 262. Cromwell v. Ferrier, 225 N.E.2d 749, 755 (N.Y. 1967). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See Pace, supra note 253, at 587 (noting that courts frequently take notice of the 
economic relationship between aesthetics and tourism in upholding regulations based mainly on 
aesthetics); Katherine Dunn Parsons, Billboard Regulation After Metromedia and Lucas, 31 
HOUS. L. REV. 1555, 1562 (1995) (noting that many contemporary courts continue to link a 
regulation’s aesthetic purpose with traditional subjects for exercising police power such as 
economics); Poindexter, supra note 255, at 485 (noting that in Berman and the cases following it 
allowing purely aesthetic regulation, aesthetics do not stand alone in justifying the regulation). 
 265. See Taylor v. Town of Plaistow, 872 A.2d 769, 772 (N.H. 2005) (holding that a 
municipality may use zoning power solely to advance aesthetic values because preservation or 
enhancement of visual environment promotes the general welfare); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. 
Town of Westfield, 324 A.2d 113, 119 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (explicitly rejecting 
plaintiff’s contention that ordinances may not be enacted solely for aesthetic reasons but must be 
linked to property values in order to be upheld and holding that aesthetics alone are a valid basis 
for the police power). 
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include within the concept of “general welfare” the enhancement of the 
citizen’s cultural life.266 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court had an occasion to revisit the issue of 
aesthetic regulation in the context of a California ordinance placing restrictions 
on billboards.267  The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional on First 
Amendment grounds, but reaffirmed that enhancement of the aesthetic 
appearance of the city was a legitimate government interest.268  It should be 
noted, however, that the city also asserted an alternative rationale—the 
enhancement of traffic safety—in support of the ordinance.269 
The modern trend has not enjoyed universal support. A number of 
jurisdictions continue to hold the view that regulations based on aesthetics 
alone are invalid.270  Several commentators have offered critiques of regulating 
based on aesthetics.271  Courts also recognize the dangers of subjectivity and 
imprecision that can occur with regulations motivated by aesthetics.  Even the 
 
 266. Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255, 261 (Or. 1965) (en banc). 
 267. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of S.D., 453 U.S. 490, 493 (1981). 
 268. Id. at 510, 521. 
 269. Id. at 508–09. 
 270. See J. F. Ghent, Annotation, Aesthetic Objections or Considerations as Affecting Validity 
of Zoning Ordinance, 21 A.L.R. 3d 1222, 1226–35 (1968) (collecting and discussing cases from 
jurisdictions holding that ordinances based solely or predominantly on aesthetic considerations 
are necessarily invalid in the context of zoning). 
 271. Professor Georgette Poindexter describes aesthetics as a “broad and somewhat 
indefinable concept to begin with,” complicated by a lack of clear limits to its applicability.  
Poindexter, supra note 255, at 485.  She describes how courts have difficulty in finding a clearly 
stated legitimate purpose to support purely aesthetic zoning because aesthetics are based on the 
subjective notion of beauty, which in itself is impossible to precisely define.  Id.  She also argues 
that the notion that furthering aesthetic values alone constitutes a public good has received little 
support because “any argument for public good based solely on beauty evaporates into a 
subjective quagmire incapable of definition.”  Id. at 486.  Professor John Costonis also criticizes 
what he perceives as an unjustified beauty-based rationale for legal aesthetics and argues for 
substitution of a stability-based rationale centered on promoting individual and social needs for 
stability in the face of environmental changes.  JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW, 
AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE xv (1989).  He critiques both the reasoning used by 
courts when asserting that government may regulate solely for aesthetics and judges’ “clumsy 
attempts to found legal aesthetics’ public purpose in beauty.”  Id. at 78.  He is dismayed by the 
conclusory statements of many courts that the promotion of community aesthetics is in the 
public’s best interest and thus appropriate for regulation.  Id.  Costonis also subscribes to the view 
that it is impossible to achieve coherent standards in a beauty-based legal aesthetics system 
because beauty cannot be “confined by standards.”  Id. at 80.  Because modern courts have failed 
both to provide a legitimate underlying rationale for the legitimacy of aesthetic regulation and to 
coherently articulate the limits of state power in promoting aesthetic values, Costonis believes 
that the current state of such regulation cannot stand.  Smith, supra note 246, at 792.  Costonis 
advocates a stability based rationale because in his opinion, such a system would provide more 
workable standards on which to base decisions as well as more clearly defined limits to the state’s 
power.  Id. at 793. 
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Supreme Court, while upholding aesthetic considerations as a valid basis for 
regulation, recognized that aesthetic judgments “are necessarily subjective, 
defying objective evaluation, and for that reason must be carefully scrutinized 
to determine if they are only a public rationalization of an impermissible 
purpose.”272  Another opinion recognized the inherently subjective nature of 
aesthetics and declared that “courts cannot act as arbiters of proper aesthetics 
and good taste, and should not enjoin an activity solely because it causes some 
aesthetic discomfort or annoyance.”273  Language found in other opinions 
generally echoes these concerns about imprecision and subjectivity.274  Critics 
of aesthetic regulation also view it as an unnecessary extension of the police 
power that has the potential to set a dangerous precedent for government 
encroachment on individual liberties and property rights and a symbol of over-
intrusive government.275 
Even if the government has the power to legislate aesthetic values, it is 
important to consider how appropriate it is to exercise that power to 
criminalize the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sports.  On the one 
hand, there are those who say that the government has a legitimate role in 
furthering community values.276  Communitarians espouse the idea that “it is 
entirely proper for the state to promote particular conceptions of the good.”277  
On the other hand, others maintain that the government should interfere as 
little as possible with individual freedom.278  Consistent with this latter view, 
the government should be reluctant to attempt to control personal aesthetics—
that is, the aesthetic component of personal behavior or appearance.279 
 
 272. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510. 
 273. Saurer v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 629 N.E.2d 893, 898 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). 
 274. See Damurjian v. Bd. of Adjustment, 690 A.2d 655, 660 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1997) (recognizing that while aesthetics are a legitimate aim of zoning, accomplishing it through 
clearly defined limits is difficult because the concept of aesthetics is abstract and subjective, 
leading to difficulty with legislative attempts to quantify it and establish standards); Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm’n, 100 F.3d 175, 196 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(distinguishing aesthetic-based regulations from public safety regulations on ground that aesthetic 
regulations often stem from subjective assessments not easily amenable to objective measurement 
or empirical refutation). 
 275. Regan, supra note 260, at 1027–28. 
 276. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 6–7 (1984). 
 277. Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 445 
(2000). 
 278. See SANDEL, supra note 276, at 1, 6–7. 
 279. Obviously the First Amendment severely limits the government’s ability to control the 
aesthetics of speech or artistic expression.  However, it would be difficult to regard the use of 
performance-enhancing drugs in sports as protected by the First Amendment.  For example, 
witness the debate over the ritual use of peyote (a hallucinogenic drug) in Native American 
religious ceremonies.  If the Supreme Court is unwilling to allow the use of illegal drugs in 
conjunction with the exercise of religion, it seems particularly unlikely that they would sanction 
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Reconciling liberalism and communitarianism is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, it seems reasonable that, given the importance of the 
nation’s liberal tradition and the danger of excessive state power, the 
government should not regulate the aesthetics of sports except under the most 
egregious circumstances.  An example might be creating a visibly chimerical 
human athlete—that is, an athlete who had been genetically engineered to 
combine the physical features of human and animal.280  Short of such extreme 
cases, the government would be wise to leave the regulation of adult doping to 
sports organizations themselves. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Whatever one may think of the use of performance-enhancing drugs in 
sports and of the proper role of government in effectuating anti-doping policy, 
it is important to distinguish between performance-enhancement in sports and 
in non-sports endeavors.  Outside of sports (as well as games, and perhaps 
some arts), human accomplishments are valued primarily for the social benefits 
they confer, rather than for the way in which they are achieved.  A composer 
who completes a masterpiece in a few minutes or with little formal training 
produces music that is just as beautiful as if it took years of training and labor.  
A researcher who discovers a cure for cancer by accident is just as likely to 
win a Nobel Prize as one who engages in meticulous experimentation.  The 
only qualification is that the result must not be stolen from someone else’s 
work. 
It therefore is important that the antipathy toward performance-
enhancement in sports, if it persists, does not carry over into other realms of 
human activity.  Performance-enhancement could yield significant benefits to 
society.  For instance, drugs being developed to treat Alzheimer’s disease have 
been shown to improve cognitive performance in healthy volunteers.281  Better 
cognition could improve workplace and scholarly productivity, increase 
transportation safety, and accelerate scientific progress.  If the notion that 
performance-enhancement is evil propels the government to ban enhancement-
uses of these drugs, this societal benefit would be lost. 
A glimpse of this attitude can be seen in Congress’s recent hostility toward 
funding access to Viagra under Medicare and Medicaid.282  True, it may be 
 
violations of controlled substance regulations in the name of improved athletic performance.  See 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 280. An example is provided by the cover illustration of ANDY MIAH, GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED ATHLETES: BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, GENE DOPING AND SPORT (2004) (“Cheetah-man,” 
by Daniel Lee, 1999). 
 281. See J. A. Yesavage et al., Donepezil and Flight Simulator Performance: Effects on 
Retention of Complex Skills, 59 NEUROLOGY 123, 123–24 (2002). 
 282. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Rejects Coverage of Impotence Pills, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
2005, at A10. 
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harder to argue that enhancing sexual performance confers societal benefit, in 
contrast, say, to enhancing cognition.  But if Congress’s attitude toward Viagra 
is the shape of things to come, then society will lose countless benefits merely 
to satisfy the tastes, and cater to the fears, of some of its members. 
APPENDIX A: 
STATE STEROID REGULATION AND SCHEDULING 
 
STATE SCHEDULE CITATION 
OTHER SPECIAL LAWS AND 
INFORMATION 
Alabama III 
ALA. STATE BD. OF 
HEALTH RULES CH. 
420-7-2  
Alabama State Board of Health may 
add, delete, or reschedule all 
controlled substances.  ALA. CODE § 
20-2-20 (2004).  The State Board of 
Health’s scheduling of controlled 
substances may be found at Ch. 420-
7-2 of its Rules, available at 
http://www.adph.org/administration/
controlled.pdf. 
Alaska N/A   
Arizona III 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 
36-2514 (2004) 
Medical professionals can lose their 
licenses for misdispensing steroids.  
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1451 
(2004). 
Arkansas III 
Arkansas Controlled 
Substance List 
The Arkansas Controlled Substance 
List is available at 
http://www.sosweb.state.ar.us/electi
ons/elections_pdfs/register/sept-03-
reg/007.07.03-001.pdf. 
California III 
CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 
11056 (2003) 
Illegal to advertise steroids (BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 17533.10); warnings 
must be posted in athletic facilities 
(CIVIL CODE § 1812.97); education 
for students  (EDUC. CODE § 51261); 
teacher training (EDUC. CODE § 
51262); supplements with precursors 
must have warning labels (HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE § 110423); 
misdemeanor to sell precursors to 
minors (HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
11100). 
Colorado III COLO. REV. STAT. § Medical professionals can lose their 
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18-18-205 (2005)   licenses for misdispensing steroids.  
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-116 
(2005).  Prescriptions for steroids 
must include the reason for the 
prescription.  Id. § 12-22-123. 
Connecticut III 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
21a-243 (2004) 
 
District of 
Columbia 
III 
D.C. CODE § 48-
902.08 (2001) 
 
Delaware III 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
16, § 4718 (2005) 
 
Florida III 
FLA. STAT. § 893.03 
(2003) 
 
Georgia III 
GA. CODE ANN. §  
16-13-27 (2003) 
 
Hawaii III 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 
329-18 (2004) 
 
Idaho III 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
37-2709 (2000) 
 
Illinois III 
720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 570/208 
(2000) 
Education programs (20 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 301/20-15 (2004)); steroid 
offenses deserve harshest penalties 
(720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/411 
(2002)); prescription controls (720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/308–12). 
Indiana III 
IND. CODE § 35-48-
2-8 (2001) 
 
Iowa III 
IOWA CODE § 
124.208 (2003) 
 
Kansas III 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
65-4109 (2002)  
Medical professionals can lose their 
licenses for misdispensing steroids.  
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2836 (2002). 
Kentucky III 
KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 218A.090 
(2005) 
 
Louisiana III 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40:964 (2004) 
Specifically criminalizes anabolic 
steroids.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
40:968 (2001). 
Maine N/A   
Maryland III 
MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. LAW § 5-404 
(2002)  
Notices must be posted in athletic 
facilities.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW § 5-710 (2002). 
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Massachusetts III 
MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 94C, § 2 (1997) 
 
Michigan N/A  
Notices detailing penalties must be 
posted in athletic facilities.  MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 333.26302 (2001).  
Trafficking in anabolic steroids can 
be prosecuted under racketeering 
statutes.  Id. § 750.159g. 
Minnesota III 
MINN. STAT. § 
152.02 (2005) 
 
Mississippi III 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 
41-29-117 (2001) 
 
Missouri III 
MO. REV. STAT. § 
195.017 (2005) 
 
Montana III 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 
50-32-226 (1997) 
 
Nebraska III 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 
28-405 (2005) 
Students at state schools can be 
barred from extra-curriculars for 
steroid use.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-
296 (2003).  State employees can be 
fired for steroid convictions and not 
rehired for a year thereafter.  Id. § 
48-233. 
Nevada III 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 
453.011 (1999) 
 
New 
Hampshire 
III 
N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 318-B:1 
(2001) 
 
New Jersey N/A  
Education programs for K-12 (N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 18A:40A-3 (1999)); 
students can get in trouble for steroid 
use (Id. § 18A:40A-23); teachers can 
receive training about steroids (Id. § 
18A:40A-3). 
New Mexico III 
N.M. STAT. § 30-31-
5 (2005) 
A full table of controlled substances 
is available at 
http://www.state.nm.us/pharmacy/co
ntrolledsubstances.html. 
New York II 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH 
LAW § 3306 (2003) 
 
North Carolina III 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
90-91 (2001) 
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North Dakota III 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 
19-03.1-09 (2003) 
 
Ohio III 
OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3719.41 
(2005)  
Public grade schools (6-12), public 
universities, and private athletic 
facilities must post notices.  OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§  3313.752, 
3345.41, 3705.50 (2005).  
Professionals can lose their licenses 
for drug (including steroid) offenses.  
Id. § 2925.38.  Prescriptions can 
only be written in accordance with 
Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic 
Act.  Id. § 3719.06 
Oklahoma III 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, 
§ 2-208 (2004)  
Prescriptions can only be written for 
valid medical purposes.  OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 63, § 2-312.1 (2004).   
Oregon N/A   
Pennsylvania III 
35 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 780-104 (2005)  
Students must be educated about 
steroids and can get in trouble at 
schools for using; schools must ban 
steroids.  35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
807.1–3 (2003).  Prescriptions must 
include a valid reason and 
professionals can lose their license 
for writing a prescription for 
enhancement.  Id. §§ 807.4–5. 
Rhode Island III 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
21-28-2.08 (2002) 
Coaches must warn students about 
steroids.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-11.1-
2 (2001). 
South Carolina N/A  
Non-medical personnel cannot 
distribute steroids.  S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 44-53-1530 (2000).  Professionals 
can lose their license for 
misprescribing.  Id. §  44-53-1520.   
South Dakota III 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 34-20B-22 (2000) 
 
Tennessee III 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 
39-17-410 (2000) 
Physicians cannot prescribe for 
enhancement.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 
39-17-430 (2003).   
Texas III 
TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 481.104 (2003) 
No prescriptions for enhancement.  
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 481.071 (2003).  Grade schools 
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and universities must post warnings.  
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 38.008, 
51.921 (1996). 
Utah III 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 
58-37-4 (2003) 
Physicians can lose their licenses for 
enhancement prescriptions.  UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37-6 (2003). 
Vermont N/A   
Virginia III 
VA. CODE ANN. § 
54.1-3450 (2005) 
Students are ineligible for 
interscholastic sports if they use 
steroids.  VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-
276.3 (2003).  School employees can 
be fired for dispensing steroids.  Id. 
§ 22.1-292.2.  Reporting 
requirements exist for students 
suspected of using steroids.  Id. § 
22.1-279.3:1.  Bans exist on caffeine 
pills and ephedra.  Id. § 18.2-248.5. 
Washington III 
WASH. REV. CODE § 
69.50.208 (2005) 
 
West Virginia III 
W. VA. CODE § 
60A-2-208 (2002) 
 
Wisconsin III 
WIS. STAT. § 961.18 
(2005) 
 
Wyoming III 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
35-7-1017 (2005) 
 
 
APPENDIX B: 
STATE STEROID LAW CITATIONS 
STATE CITATION SUBJECT MATTER 
Alabama 
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-12-210–219 
(2005) 
Drug Possession and Sale Offenses 
ALA. CODE §§ 20-2-20–32 (2005) Standards and Schedules 
Alaska Nothing found Controlled by federal law 
Arizona 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3401–3422 
(2004) 
Drug Offenses 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1422 (2004) Licensing Doctors 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1522 (2004) Licensing Naturopathic Physicians 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1822 (2004) Licensing Osteopathic Physicians 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2521 (2004) Licensing Physician Assistants 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2912 (2004) Licensing Homeopathic Physicians 
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-2511–2516 
(2004) 
Schedules 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2531 (2004) Offenses and Penalties 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-2541–2544 
(2004) 
Enforcement and Administration 
Arkansas 
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-64-101–
1303 (2005) 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
California 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 
17533.10 (2005) 
Unlawful To Advertise Anabolic 
Steroids 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.97 (2005) 
Warnings Must Be Posted in 
Athletic Facilities 
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44645 (2005) 
Teachers To Receive Training 
About Anabolics 
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51262 (2005) 
Education About Steroids: Grades 
7–12 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 
11053–11058 (2005) 
Controlled Substances Act, 
Schedules  
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
11377 (2005) 
Simple Possession Is a 
Misdemeanor 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
11999.2 (2005) 
Teaching Materials Cannot 
Promote Use of Anabolics 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 
110423–110423.6 (2005) 
Supplements with Precursors Must 
Have Warning Labels 
Colorado 
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-18-101–
605 (2004) 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-22-123  
(2005) 
Prescriptions for Anabolic Steroids 
Must Include Reason for 
Prescription 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-117 
(2004) 
Licensing Doctors 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-38-117 
(2004) 
Licensing Nurses 
Connecticut 
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 21a-240–315 
(2005) 
Dependency Producing Drugs 
Delaware 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4701–
4796 (2005)  
Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
D.C. 
D.C. CODE §§ 48-901.01–907.03 
(2005) 
Controlled Substances Act 
Florida FLA. STAT. §§ 893.01–.20 (2005) 
Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control 
Georgia 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-20–56 
(2004) 
Regulation of Controlled 
Substances 
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Hawaii 
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 329-1–128 
(2004) 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
Idaho 
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-2701–
2751 (2005) 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
Illinois 
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 301/20-15 
(2005) 
Department of Human Services 
Can Create Education Programs 
About Steroids 
105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-23.3 
(2006) 
Education About Steroids: Grades 
7–12 
410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 620/3.22 
(2005) 
Criminalizes Non-medical 
Distribution of HGH 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/100–603 
(2005) 
Illinois Controlled Substances Act 
Indiana 
IND. CODE § 16-18-2-15 (2004) Defines steroids 
IND. CODE §§ 16-42-19-1–28 
(2004) 
Indiana Legend Drug Act 
IND. CODE §§ 35-48-2-1–7-15 
(2004) 
Controlled Substances 
Iowa 
IOWA CODE §§ 124.101–.602 
(2004) 
Controlled Substances 
IOWA CODE §§ 126.1–.26 (2004) Drugs, Devices, and Cosmetics 
Kansas 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2837 (2005) 
Steroids Without a Prescription 
Constitutes Unprofessional 
Conduct 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-4101–4143 
(2005) 
Controlled Substances Act 
Kentucky 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 218A.010–
994 (2004) 
Controlled Substances 
Louisiana 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:961–
1003 (2005) 
Uniform Controlled Dangerous 
Substances Law 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1239 
(2005) 
Anabolic Steroids 
Maine 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 
1101–1118 (2005) 
Drugs 
Maryland 
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW §§ 5-
101–1101 (2004) 
Controlled Dangerous Substances, 
Prescriptions, and Other Substances 
Massachusetts 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, §§ 1–
48 (2005)  
Controlled Substances Act 
Michigan 
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.7101–
.7545 (2005) 
Controlled Substances 
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.26301–
26306 (2005) 
Steroid Warnings at Athletic 
Facilities 
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MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.159g 
(2004) 
Trafficking in Steroids Can Be 
Charged Under Racketeering 
Statutes 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.411j 
(2004) 
In Terms of Penalties, Steroid 
Offenses are Grouped with 
Controlled Substances  
Minnesota MINN. STAT. §§ 152.01–.21 (2004) Drugs, Controlled Substances 
Mississippi 
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-101–
187 (2005) 
Uniform Controlled Substances 
Law 
Missouri 
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 195.003–.515 
(2005) 
Drug Regulation 
Montana 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-102 
(2005) 
Criminal Possession of Dangerous 
Drugs 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-32-101–
502 (2005) 
Controlled Substances 
Nebraska 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-401–457 
(2004) 
Crimes and Punishments: Drugs 
and Narcotics 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-233 (2005) 
State Employees Who Take 
Steroids 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-296 (2005) 
Students Taking Steroids Can Be 
Barred from Extracurriculars 
Nevada 
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 453.011–.348 
(2004) 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
New 
Hampshire 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 318-B:1–
30 (2004) 
Controlled Drug Act 
New Jersey 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:40A-1–7.2 
(2005) 
Education and Substance Abuse 
N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8:65-10.1–.5 
(2005) 
Scheduling 
New Mexico N.M. STAT. §§ 30-31-1–41 (2005) Controlled Substances 
New York 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3306 
(2005) 
Controlled Substances Act, 
Scheduling 
North Carolina 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-87–113.8 
(2005) 
North Carolina Controlled 
Substances Act 
North Dakota 
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-01–
46 (2005) 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
Ohio 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2925.01–
.52 (2005) 
Drug Offenses 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.752 
(2005) 
Public Schools Must Post Warnings 
in Locker Rooms for Grades 6–12 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.41 
(2005) 
State Universities Must Post 
Warnings in Locker Rooms 
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.50 
(2005) 
Public and Private Athletic 
Facilities Must Post Warnings 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3719.01–
.99 (2005) 
Controlled Substances 
Oklahoma 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2-101–610 
(2004) 
Uniform Controlled Dangerous 
Substances Act 
Oregon 
OR. REV. STAT §§ 475.005–.295 
(2003) 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
Pennsylvania 
35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 780-101–144 
(2005) 
The Controlled Substance, Drug, 
Device and Cosmetic Act 
35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 807.1–.2 
(2005) 
Steroids in Schools 
Rhode Island 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-11.1-2 (2004) 
Coaches Must Deliver Preseason 
Lectures About Steroids 
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 21-28-1.01–
6.01 (2004) 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
South Carolina 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-90 (2005) Crimes Classified as Felonies 
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-53-1510–
1550 (2004) 
Poisons, Drugs, and Other 
Controlled Substances: Anabolic 
Steroids 
South Dakota 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-20B-1–
114 (2004) 
Drugs and Substances Control 
Tennessee 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-401–
451 (2004) 
Drugs 
Texas 
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 38.008 
(2005) 
Schools Must Post Warnings About 
Steroids 
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.921 
(2005) 
Public Colleges and Universities 
Must Post Warnings 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§§ 481.001–.205 (2005) 
Texas Controlled Substances Act 
Utah 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-1–21 
(2005) 
Utah Controlled Substances Act 
Vermont Nothing found Controlled by federal law 
Virginia 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-247–265 
(2005) 
Crimes Involving Health and 
Safety: Drugs 
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277.08 
(2005) 
Drugs in Schools 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-3400–3472 
(2005)  
Drug Control Act 
Washington 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.41.300–
.900 (2005) 
Use of Steroids 
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WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.41.010–
.900 (2005) 
Legend Drugs: Prescription Drugs 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50.101–
.609 (2005) 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
West Virginia 
W.VA. CODE §§ 60A-1-101–10-15 
(2005) 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. §§ 961.001–.67 (2004) Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
Wyoming 
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-7-1001–
1060 (2005) 
Controlled Substances 
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